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In Chapter 1, I take advantage of uncertainty regarding future land use restrictions in order to
empirically identify the value of the redevelopment option embedded in real estate prices for New
York City (NYC) from 2003-2015. Using a two-stage estimation procedure, ergodic propensities
to be zoned to either residential, commercial, or manufacturing land uses are interacted with a
proxy for the propensity to be redeveloped. Results show that the interactions provide significantly
greater explanatory power than using the intensity proxy alone. And that all option value terms are
statistically significant. I estimate the average option value to redevelop in Manhattan & Brooklyn
for years 2003-2015 is 20% and 8.5% of total estimated property value in Manhattan and Brooklyn
respectively. I also find evidence that manufacturing lots identified as residential by the model sell
for a premium of 50% per square foot.
Chapter 2 considers commercial real estate (CRE), a major institutional asset class to which
the banking sector has considerable exposure. Because CRE prices tend to be smoothed it is hard
to infer their relationship with fundamentals. This is compounded by the presence of complicated
underlying dynamics. For instance, inflation acts to increase discount rates but may also be associ-
ated with higher rental revenues. Thus it is difficult to sign the impact of inflation on CRE prices,
especially given that the dynamics of macro fundamentals periodically undergo regime changes.
Similar considerations apply to real economic growth and, by extension, interest rates. We esti-
mate a model, consistent with rational expectations, where regime-dependent macro fundamentals
are anticipated in prices. We find that real estate fundamentals and prices vary with macro funda-
mentals and are highly sensitive to potential regime changes. Correspondingly, information in real
estate prices improves the identification macro regimes. Our model allows us to quantify sources
iii
of systematic risk in real estate and price mortgages (which are sensitive to the joint dynamics of
interest rates and real estate prices). To the extent that regimes in macro fundamentals arise from
shifts in monetary policy, our model may also be used for policy analysis.
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CHAPTER 1
THE REDEVELOPMENT OPTION AND LAND USE RESTRICTIONS ACROSS SPACE
AND TIME
1.1 Introduction
Few studies focus on zoning regulation’s impact on property values through the lens of an op-
tions pricing framework. Intuitively, land that is legally allowed to be developed into multiple uses
should fetch a higher price than the same plot of land restricted to a single-use. Childs, Riddiough,
and Triantis (1996) and Geltner, Riddiough, and Stojanovic (1996) provide a theoretical founda-
tion in the options pricing framework to cement the above intuition. Yet, no studies have attempted
to estimate how potential changes in land use restrictions impact the option value to redevelop real
estate.
Zoning policy typically regulates two dimensions of property characteristics: intensity and use.
Intensity corresponds to the allowed size and dimensions a structure can be built on a given plot of
land. One justification for such restrictions is to allow adequate sunlight to penetrate to the street.1
The second dimension restricts the allowed use of the built property. The justification for reg-
ulating land use is to minimize the external costs that certain building types impose on nearby
tenants and to maximize external benefits resulting from agglomeration effects.2 For example,
living next to an industrial factory creates both air and sound pollution, which detracts from the
welfare of the neighboring residents. Thus it is optimal to allocate certain areas of land for indus-
trial use far away from residential areas. Similarly, centrally located businesses within an industry
can minimize the cost of travel required for face-to-face interaction.
Michael Bloomberg was the mayor of the City of New York from 2002 through 2013. Over
1Bliss (2016)
2Strange and Rosenthal (2001)
1
that period, the Bloomberg Administration rezoned approximately 40% of all the properties in the
city. As Dan Doctoroff, the former deputy mayor of economic development for the City of New
York, noted in an interview:
We believed New York’s economy needed a massive jolt of energy and a push forward
to prepare it for the 21st century. If you looked across the city, there were thousands
of acres of land that were unused, largely because they were zoned for industrial or
manufacturing uses for which could not compete anymore. Many were on some of the
most valuable real estate in New York, like along the waterfront, on the West Side of
Manhattan, or near Downtown Brooklyn.... In the end, we did 140 separate rezonings
during the Bloomberg administration. 40 percent of the city was rezoned.3
We take advantage of the numerous rezonings that occurred during the Bloomberg adminis-
tration to examine how the option value to redevelop real estate fluctuates with changes in zoning
designations that correspond to the allowed land use. While many studies in the Urban Economics
literature have attempted to disentangle the impact zoning has on property values,4 the they focus
on the impact of changes in the allowed intensity of the building.
To address the question of how changes in the land use component of zoning regulations impact
property values, we estimate time-varying propensities of being zoned to each land use designation
to proxy for the probabilities of switching zoning designation in the future. We then incorporate
these probabilities into the hedonic pricing model of Rosen (1974) to identify how changes in
the long-run likelihood of being rezoned impacts the redevelopment option via the framework
employed in Clapp and Salavei (2010). Variation in expectations of future zoning designation
around major rezoning events is employed in an hedonic estimation to identify the redevelop option
component of real estate values.
We find evidence that, on average, the redevelopment option constitutes 20% of total estimated
3Florida (2017)
4McMillen and McDonald (1991), McMillen and McDonald (2002), Glaeser and Gyourko (2003), Ihlanfeldt
(2007)
2
property value in Manhattan and 8% in Brooklyn. There is also evidence that manufacturing-zoned
properties identified by our model as wholly residential sell for a 50% premium per square foot.
Lastly, we present evidence that the redevelop option as a percent of the total property value is
counter-cyclical with the real estate cycle.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 1.2 presents the motivation for the re-
search and presents a motivation model to accompany the empirical analysis. Section 1.3 discusses
the data sources and summary statistics. Section 1.4 presents the empirical framework and identifi-
cation strategy. Section 1.5 presents and discusses the results of the estimation. Finally, Section 1.6
concludes.
1.2 Motivation
The value of a property, PVi,t, can roughly be separated into the value of the land, V Li,t, and the
building that sits on the land, V Bi,t . This relationship holds exactly if the construction industry is






The value of the building, V (B)i,t , is the replacement cost to build a structure as similar as possible
to the one that already exists on the land. This value tends to decrease with depreciation, Di,t,
increase with renovations, Ii,t, and size, SIZEi,t. The main driver is the cost of construction, Ci,t,
which includes labor and capital expenses.
V
(B)
i,t = f(Ii,t, Di,t, Ci,t, SIZEi,t) (1.2)
Most of the variation in property values comes from the value of the land that the structure sits
on (Davis and Heathcote (2005), Knoll, Schularick, and Steger (2017)). In the urban economics
literature, the value of land is thought to represent a call option on development (or redevelop-
ment).5 When choosing to develop land, the developer must choose both the use of the land and
5Titman (1985)
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the intensity to which to develop the land. Childs et al. (1996) and Williams (1997) examine the
option to continually redevelop a property. Childs et al. (1996) focuses on the option to reconfigure
a property between two uses (as well as mixing the two uses), while Williams (1997) focuses on
the option to increase the intensity or quality of the property while holding its use constant. Both
Childs et al. (1996) and Williams (1997) find that the option to redevelop decreases with an in-
creased correlation between market value of uses and increases with uncertainty regarding future
rents.
Zoning restrictions limit both land use and building intensity. Thus a change in zoning desig-
nation will have implications for the price of a property. In New York City, a rezoned property can
continue to operate under the current use, but significant renovations or redevelopment cannot oc-
cur without switching land use to the new designation.6 When making the redevelopment decision,
the developer must consider the expected net payoff of redeveloping the property to its highest and
best use today, as well as the net payoff of delaying the redevelopment into the future.
The critical insight of this paper is to recognize that the value of the highest and best use of
a property today is limited by the zoning designation today, and the expected value of the highest
and best use tomorrow is a function of expected zoning designation tomorrow. In other words, the
zoning designation of any property in the future is uncertain, and the value of the (re)development
option should reflect this uncertainty.
Consider a simple two-period example where a landowner is deciding to develop vacant land
under uncertainty with regards to the zoning designation. There are two possible zoning desig-
nations, zt ∈ {1, 2}. Today the zoning designation is use i, z1 = i. Tomorrow, there is some
probability, α > 0, of being rezoned to use j 6= i, and a probability of (1 − α) > 0, of keeping
the same zoning designation. From the perspective of the landowner, the choice to develop will
depend on weighing the payoff of developing the property to its highest and best use today for
property type i, HBUi, with tomorrow’s expected payoff and with the possibility of being able to
develop to use j. In this situation, the value of land is
















where NPVi is the net present value of developing to the highest and best use given the zoning
designation today is i, and r > 0 is the rate of return on the built property (assumed constant across






That is, the developer will wait to the later period to develop for the chance event of the zoning
designation changing only if the developed property is expected to be more valuable under use
j by an amount larger or equal to the rents foregone by waiting a period to develop, r · NPVi,
divided by the probability of switching zoning designation, α. This hurdle rate, r
α
, is decreasing in
the probability of switching zoning designations and increasing in the opportunity cost of waiting
to develop. For the special case where a zoning change is certain, α = 1, the value of the property
if it were to be developed to use j must be at least as large as the opportunity cost of waiting. As
the probability of being rezoned becomes extremely unlikely, the hurdle value gets larger and the
developer will never choose to wait. The key takeaway from this toy model is that the probability
of being rezoned, something that occurs with a non-insignificant frequency in New York City from
2003-2015, will impact the option value of redevelopment. The intuition of the toy model above is
easily extended to the case of redevelopment.
In many geographies the zoning process is static. In New York City, we find that 2% of all
properties in the beginning of the sample switched zoning designation at the end of the sample
in 2015. Table 1.1 details the number of zoning changes that occurred for all lots present in the
beginning of the sample. Figure 1.1 shows the nature of each transition and where they occurred
across space.
Out of 294,040 lots, 5,758 (or roughly 2%) of lots changed land use designation. On net there
was an increase in residential and mixed use zoned lots, a small decline in commercial lots, and a
20% decline in manufacturing lots. Yet, there is significant variation in changes conditioning on the
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initial zoning designation. For example, even though there was a steep decline in manufacturing
lots overall, 84 residential and 30 commercial lots were rezoned to be manufacturing.
Out of the 16,149 commercially zoned lots at the beginning of the sample, 14,598 (90%) stayed
commercial, 1,466 (9%) switched to residential, and the remaining percent is split relatively evenly
between manufacturing and mixed-use manufacturing /residential. For the 13,325 lots zoned man-
ufacturing at the beginning of the sample, where we see the most zoning changes, 10,538 (79%)
stayed manufacturing, 865 (6.5%) switched to commercial, 1,922 (14.5%) switched to residen-
tial or mixed use manufacturing/residential. Most residential lots stayed residential, but a not
insignificant amount of residential lots did switch. Out of the 263,365 lots zoned residential at
the beginning of the sample, 595 switched to commercial and 84 switched to manufacturing. The
big picture that the data presents to us is that there was a large migration from commercial and
manufacturing to residential, with most zoning changes coming from manufacturing zoned lots.
However, the changes are not monotonic, and in a given quarter, we may observe a single change
from residential to manufacturing.
1.2.1 Motivational Model
In reality, the assumption of perfect competition in the construction industry doesn’t hold, and
we cannot separate the value of land from the structure that sits on the land so easily. A more
true-to-life model must take into account uncertainty regarding when the existing structure will be
Table 1.1: Zoning changes that occurred or did not for all lots present in the beginning of the
sample from all boroughs from 2003-2017. Res/Man refers to a mixed zoning designation where
the property can be used for both residential and manufacturing purposes.
Source Commercial Manufacturing Residential Res/Man Total
Commercial 14,598 30 1,466 55 16,149
Manufacturing 865 10,538 935 987 13,325
Residential 595 84 262,683 3 263,365
Res./Man. 24 1 713 463 1,201
Net Change (-67) (-2,672) (2,432) (307)
6
Figure 1.1: Zoning transitions in Brooklyn (bottom) & Manhattan (top) from 2003 -2015. The
figure on the left shows the original zoning designation of each property, and the figure on the
right shows the zoning designation each property switched to. The dots are colored by zoning
designation; red being commercial, green being manufacturing, and blue being residential.
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redeveloped and average the net present value of cash flows from the current structure over various
redevelopment horizons.
First, assume that macro-fundamentals, Xt, are exogenous and drive dynamics in both the
rental market for real estate and the market for selling real estate. Macro-fundamentals also drive
time-variation in the zoning process, Zi,t ∈ {C,M,R}, and the zoning process follows a time-
varying Markov chain conditional on vocational characteristics, qi,t:
Zi,t ∼ Π(Xt, qi,t), (1.5)
where C represents commercially zoned lots used for office and retail space, M represents man-
ufacturing zoned lots which are typically warehouse structures used for production, storage, or
logistic centers, and R represents residential zoned lots which is any structure for which people
reside, including apartments.
Each property owner either chooses to redevelop, Ri,t = 0, or to wait, Ri,t = 0, with the
objective of maximizing the value of his property. If he chooses to wait, his building gets older,
which will impact his expected cash flow next period. If he chooses to redevelop, the new use of
the building must conform with the current zoning designation, LUi,t = Zi,t, where LUi,t is the
operational use of the building; he must pay the cost of redevelopment, K, upfront; and he must
wait d periods to begin collecting cash flow from the new building,
agei,t =
 agei,t−1 + 1, if Ri,t = 0−d, if Ri,t = 1,
 . (1.6)
CFi,t = 1(age ≥ 0) exp{κ(Xt, LUi,t)qi,t + γ(Xt, LUi,t)agei,t +φ(Xt, LUi,t)age2i,t +wi,t}−RtK,
(1.7)
LUi,t = ZR−1i,t s.t. R
−1
i,t := {max τ ≤ t : Ri,τ = 1}. (1.8)
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In Equation (7), qi,t represents any locational characteristics that may generate a premium or
discount on cash flows, as well as building characteristics independent from the age of the structure.
The coefficients κ, γ, and φ are the implied value of product characteristics as they relate to rents.
They are time-varying because rental markets respond to macro-fundamentals, and the implied
prices map into current equilibrium rents. Also there are different coefficients for each land use
as there are independent rental markets for residential, commercial, and manufacturing properties.
Cash flows are log-normally distributed, wi,t ∼ N(0, σ2w).
Equation (8) simply states that the current land use at any building is the zoning designation
at time of last redevelopment. This assumption is justified by New York City’s zoning policies,
which state that when a zoning change occurs, a building can operate under its former use until a
redevelopment occurs.
Finally, the price of a property is pinned down by the assumption of no arbitrage in the market
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. (1.9)
We can then break the price of a property into expected discounted cash flows before the first
redevelopment and the expected value of cash flows after the first redevelopment. Let R1i,t :=
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. (1.11)
The remaining portion of this paper focuses on empirically separating the first term from Equa-
tion (10) - henceforth current structure value - representing the expected discounted cash flows
from prior to the first future redevelopment, and the second term - henceforth option value to
redevelop - which is the expected future discounted cash flows post first redevelopment.
1.3 Data
The panel dataset used is constructed from various data sources described below. The final
dataset includes 48,929,331 observations. Each observation represents a single lot-quarter from
2002q2 until 2017q4. For each observation, there are a total 109 descriptive variables representing
the characteristics of the building, the geographical characteristics of the area around the building,
as well as demographic information at the census tract level.
Below, we describe the sources of the data. The Primary Land Use Tax Lot Output dataset is
used to track zoning designation as well as a wealth of other property and locational characteristics.
It is used in both the estimation of (re)zoning propensities and the hedonic sales model. New York
City’s Rolling Sales dataset reports all property transactions and is used in the hedonic estimation.
The policy dummies in the first stage come from the New York City Department of City Planning’s
Zoning Application Portal, which was scraped to compile the dataset. Lastly, both the American
Community Survey data as well as Bing Maps data is used in post-estimation to decompose option
value by location and demographics.
Selected summary statistics are presented in Table 1
1.3.1 Primary Land Use Tax Lot Output
The main dataset employed is the Primary Land Use Tax Lot Output (PLUTO), provided by
the New York City Department of City Planning. It contains extensive land use and geographic
data for the vast majority of the tax lots in NYC. The panel dataset was released on an annual basis
from 2002-2007, but since 2009, it has been released on a semi-annual basis.
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PLUTO includes over 70 fields for each tax lot. Of main interest to this paper is extensive
information on zoning designations for each property. Zoning is broken down into primary zoning
district, overlay district, and special purpose districts. Each category can contain multiple items
ordered by the share of the tax lot from largest to smallest.
Other variables of interest include the Floor Area Ratio (FAR) of a building broken down into
commercial, residential, office, retail, garage, storage, and factory. There are a number of building
descriptors such as number of floors of the building (NumFloors), the area of the lot (LotArea), an
identifier for an irregular lot, an identifier for special lot characteristics such as waterfront property,
basement type, year built (YearBuilt), the last year the building was significantly altered (LastAl-
ter), and the separately assessed value of the land (AssessLand) and building (AssessBldg) as
estimated annually by the Department of Finance for tax purposes.
The process of merging all versions of PLUTO together is no trivial task. The variables in-
cluded with each release can change from year-to-year, so special care must be taken so that all
variables are comparable. The merged dataset contains 48,929,331 million rows, and then we
create a quarterly time series from each observation date. For example, if a there is an observa-
tion from a property in 2002q1 and 2003q4, I duplicate the 2002q1 row to create observations for
2002q2 -2003q3.
1.3.2 Transaction Data
Property transactions come from the New York City Department of Finance’s Rolling Sales
data. The Rolling Sales dataset is released on an annual basis from 2003-present. It contains all
property transactions that take place in the city. In addition to a subset of variables from the PLUTO
dataset, the Rolling Sales data contains the nominal transaction price of the property (SalePrice),
as well as the gross square footage (GrossSqFt) of the building and the square footage of the lot the
building sits on (LandSqFt). Gross square footage is defined as the total floor area encompassed
by the exterior walls of a property. The land area is then the remaining square footage of the lot.
Real estate property transactions are notoriously noisy. In order to remove outliers, for each
year and borough I regress the logarithm of sale price on the logarithm of gross square ft. interacted
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with census tract – a granular measure of geography – along with other building and lot character-
istics. I then remove all observations whose studentized-residual is greater than 3.7. Finally, I do a
visual inspection for each year and borough to remove all clear outliers that may impact estimation
in the hedonic model.
1.3.3 American Community Survey
The American Community Survey (ACS) is an annual survey performed by the US Census
Bureau that collects demographic, economic, and housing data for neighborhoods across the US.
The survey commenced in 2005, but for smoothing purposes, data is only available from 2009
-present. Each observation represents a 5-year moving average. The data we use is on the census
tract level. To get an idea of how granular a census tract is, NYC is broken up into 1,335 individual
census tracts; this is far more granular than neighborhoods or even community districts.
Demographic data includes median age (MedAge) and the racial makeup of each neighbor-
hood broken down into white, African-American, Asian, Native American, and other. The “other”
designation is largely made up of the Latin American population.
Economic data in the ACS includes the percentage of households with children, the percent-
age of households that report using public transportation as their main transportation to work, the
percentage of those households that primarily walk to work, mean transit time to work, median
household income (MedHHIncome), the percentage of those reported being unemployed (%Un-
employed), the percentage of households fully covered by health insurance, the percentage of
households below the poverty line, and the percentage of households with an annual income greater
than $100,000.
The housing portion of the ACS includes the estimated vacancy rate, the percentage of residents
who rent (%Rent), the percentage of residents without a vehicle, and the median gross rent of the
area (MedGrossRent).
Finally, the education section includes the percentage of those with a less than ninth grade pri-
mary school education, the percentage with somewhere between a ninth to twelfth grade education,
the percentage of those without a high school diploma, the percentage of those with a bachelor’s
degree of higher, and lastly, the percentage of residents born in the US.
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1.3.4 ULURP Data
Data concerning the Uniform Land Use Review Process was collected by scraping data from
the DCP’s newly released Zoning Application Portal (ZAP). ZAP is a web tool that allows the
public to track the progress of current and past zoning applications through the ULURP process.
The information includes the date that each step of the ULURP was cleared, as well as the status
of each step.
From the above information I am able to “dummy out” the ULURP process, creating six
review-stage legislative dummies: one for the quarter in which the application was certified (Cert-
Dum), one for the community board recommended approval or disapproval (ResComDum), one
for the approval of the borough president, one for if the DCP has held its public forum, one for
if the DCP approved the application, and lastly, and one for if the City Council voted to pass the
application into law.
I match each zoning application by its identifier to lot identifiers (BBLs) using the shape files
released by the Department of City Planning for zoning map amendments. Using post-GIS and a
shape file version of PLUTO called mapPLUTO, I find all properties that intersect the ZMA shape
file for each version of MapPLUTO before and after the zoning amendment went into effect. I then
check that each intersecting property did indeed change zoning designation and remove those that
do not.
1.3.5 Bing Maps Data
Finally, we conjecture that simple network distance to a city center is not sufficient to capture
the complexities of NYC’s transit system. The subway system is extremely important to getting
around in New York City. Mainly, we believe that residents value how easily they are able to travel
to midtown Manhattan, from which you can get anywhere else in the city. Yet, transit times will
also be correlated with distance to nearest subway or bus station, how many subway lines are in
proximity to a property, and the idiosyncrasies of each subway line.
To capture such complexities in the data, we opt to use the Bings Map API to calculate transit
time using either the subway or bus to Grand Central Station. In addition to being a central point
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in New York City’s local subway system, it is also the meeting point of other major transportation
systems such as New Jersey Transit, Long Island Rail, and the Metro North system.
Lastly, in order to handle the fact that transit times vary across time of day, I average the
predicted transit times at 9am, 12pm, 5pm, and 9pm for all weekdays in a fixed week in August
2018. One implicit assumption is that estimated transit times in August of 2018, are representative
of the entire sample.
1.3.6 Data Discussion
A brief discussion of the data is presented below.
Selected summary statistics for the full panel dataset are reported in Table 1.2. This sample
includes all observations for all boroughs and all years.
Figure 1.2 presents the range of sale price to gross square feet between the 33rd and 66th per-
centiles in Manhattan and Brooklyn. There appears to be a common cyclical component between
the two boroughs, but real estate prices in Manhattan have increased far more than Brooklyn over
the sample period.
1.4 Empirical Framework
Clapp and Salavei (2010) develop a method to identify the option value to redevelop a property
within the hedonic model. They posit that using the age of a structure as a proxy for structural
depreciation produces a biased estimate for net depreciation because structure age might be posi-
tively correlated with the option value to redevelop the property. The intuition is that as a building
ages, depreciation causes the value of the property to decline. In addition, as the building ages, the
difference between the value of the property if it were developed for its highest and best use and
the current property value increases, causing the option value to redevelop to increase as a share
of total property value. These opposing effects make building age a biased proxy for net depreci-
ation. In order to separate the two effects, Clapp and Salavei (2010) suggest using a proxy for the
likelihood of redevelopment. The proxies proposed correspond to various measures of intensity.
Examples are the fraction of nearby sales that are teardowns, the ratio of assessed structure value
to assessed land value, and the ratio of average floor-area-ratio (FAR) of nearby new construction
to FAR of the property considered.
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Figure 1.2: This figure shows how sale price per sq. ft. in Manhattan (top) and Brooklyn (bottom)
has evolved through time. The lower bound of the range is the 33rd percentile, and the upper bound
is the 66th percentile.
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Table 1.2: Selected summary statistics.
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
SalePrice 470,565 1,309,629 16,215,434 10,040 4,111,111,766
GrossSqFt 470,565 4,270 35,125 10 8,942,176
LandSqFt 470,565 3,266 16,202 0 7,649,136
NumFloors 48,929,331 2.4 1.77 0 104
BldgArea 48,929,331 6,469 65,238 0 49,547,830
LotArea 48,929,331 5,165. 71,089 1 29,305,534
YearBuilt 48,861,359 1938 27.42 1661 2017
MetroTimeGCS 48,929,175 18.92 8.39 0.07 51.83
UR 21,951,046 6.286 3.359 0.000 62.700
MedHHIncome 21,939,060 62,398.91 23,743.18 8,694 247,167
%Rent 21,947,586 52.11 25.17 0 100
MedGrossRent 21,413,884 1,294.56 288.22 231 3,479
MedAge 21,949,333 37.22 5.74 17.3 94
HSGradRate 41,108,638 60.85 11.33 27 85.6
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In the context of the example above, the proxy of Clapp and Salavei (2010) captures the rela-
tionship between the built structure, and the option value to redevelop. The closer to redevelopment
a property is, the greater the difference between the rate of return for the property built to its high-
est and best use, rHBU , and the current rate of return, r. Simultaneously the value from the current
structure, V (B)i,t , decreases as cash flows are relatively low and redevelopment is expected to com-
mence soon so there are few remaining cash flows from the current structure. The redevelopment
value, V (L)i,t , increases as redevelopment becomes more likely because the rents foregone by rede-
velopment, r · NPVi, decrease. In the context of the motivational model above, interacting this
paper’s land use uncertainty proxy with the proxy of Clapp and Salavei (2010) should increase
identification of the option value to redevelopment by capturing both the opportunity cost that
works through foregone rents, r, as well as through rezoning probabilities, α. As an additional
contribution, identification comes from exogenous variation in the (re)zoning propensities caused
by nearby zoning changes.
Munneke and Womack (2017) extend the framework in Clapp and Salavei (2010) by directly
estimating the probability of redevelopment in a probit regression, and using those probabilities
directly in place of the proxy used by Clapp and Salavei (2010). They make further improvements
by addressing selection bias via Lee, Maddala, and Trost (1982).
To address how the uncertainty regarding zoning designation in the future impacts the redevel-
opment option, I propose a two-stage approach where in the first-stage I estimate a multinomial
logistic model to capture the propensity in the future to be restricted to each land use over a two-
year horizon. I then interact the generated propensities from the first stages in the hedonic model
with the redevelopment proxy as proposed by Clapp and Salavei (2010).
1.4.1 First Stage: Zoning Process
We model the long-run propensities to be (re)zoned as a multinomial logistic model at each
time point. In addition, to standard locational and structure characteristics, I incorporate dummy
variables in the logistic regression which correspond to the various stages of the Uniform Land






where Ψi,t is a categorical variable that identifies the zoning designation lead two years into the
future, φz is the vector whose zth element - which indexes the zoning designation - is equal to
unity, and all other elements are equal to zero. Xi,t is the vector of explanatory variables. These
include individual property and locational characteristics, legislative variables from the ULURP,
as well as census tract-specific variables that measure how the land use distribution of the census
tract deviates from the community district and borough.
The long-run (re)zoning propensities are non-linear functions of the exogenous parameters:






Note that I call the generated regressors long-run propensities because the model does not include
current zoning designation as a regressor. The zoning process is highly persistent, and if one truly
wanted to know the zoning designation a process a year from any given date the best predictor
would be the current zoning designation. What I attempt to estimate is akin to the ergodic or
zoning distribution unconditional of a property’s use today. In the context of the presented model,
I am not trying to estimate the rows of Π(Xt), which correspond to one-step-ahead transitions
probabilities, but instead what Π(Xt) converges to in its limit,
lim
t→∞
Π(Xt, qi,t) = Π
∗(Xt, qi,t).
It can be instructive to think of Π∗(Xt) as the optimal land use distribution for the city that moves
with underlying market and economic conditions. However, because there are significant frictions
associated with rezonings and redevelopments, the city planners are always chasing the optimal
distribution.
18
1.4.2 Second Stage: Hedonic Model
The final stage is a linear regression of the logarithm of sale price per square foot on building
characteristics, locational characteristics, and the long-run zoning propensities interacted with the
redevelopment proxy. The model can be viewed as a hedonic model of real estate prices where
propensity to be redeveloped as well as the propensity to be zoned to each use are unobserved
building characteristics that are priced.
To go from Equation (12), an infinite sum of expectations of log-normally distributed cash
flows, to a log-linear equation for prices, I rely on the Fenton-Wilkinson approximation of Fenton
(1960), which states that an infinite series of log-normally distributed random variables approxi-
mates a log-normal distribution.
Equation (14) is the measurement equation that is taken to the data:





γzηi,t,zLSAi,t + ui,t, (1.14)





The idea is that redevelopment option consists of an intensity dimension and a potential re-
zoning dimension. By interacting the probability of being rezoned to each designation next year
with the intensity proxy, I can understand how the potential to be rezoned impacts the option to
redevelop.

























I then define the option value associated with the propensity to be zoned use s as
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A primary concern with regards to estimation of the hedonic model is potential endogeneity
between the land use propensities and prices. It is difficult to disentangle the effect of (re)zoning
propensities on prices from the effect that prices might have on (re)zoning propensities themselves.
In order to address such concerns, I focus our estimation in the hedonic model on the sub-
sample of real estate transaction that occur within a year of a nearby major zoning change. I define
a zoning change to be major if more than twenty lots changed zoning designation in a given census
tract for any given year. I identify 41 such zoning changes throughout the sample.
For each major zoning change event, an area is defined within a mile radius of any lot that
changed zoning designation, but not within 1,000 feet of any lot that switched zoning designation.
The intuition is that a major zoning change event may very well be endogenous to transaction
prices in the area of the rezoning. However, when an area experiences a large rezoning, neighbors
that did not experience the rezoning reevaluate their expectations about what their future zoning
designation looks like. For example, if the major zoning change made a neighboring area become
more like our area, I would not expect a zoning change to occur in the future. However, if the land
use distribution of the area that experienced a zoning change becomes more different than ours, I
should increase the probability of zoning change in our neighborhood occurring in the future.
Figure 1.3 illustrates the identification strategy visually for the Hudson Yards rezoning.
1.5 Results
The results of the two-stage estimation procedure are presented below; each is accompanied
by a discussion. The entire estimation procedure is run separately for the boroughs of Manhattan
and Brooklyn, and each run includes years 2003 -2015.
Before showing the results of the hedonic model, I present evidence that the generated proxy for
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Figure 1.3: Identified real estate transactions around the Hudson Yards rezoning. Each black dot
represents a property transaction within a year of the Hudson Yards rezoning. The colored dots
represent a properties that changed zoning designations to commercial (red) and residential (blue).
The shaded area represents the identified zone: within a mile of any property that got rezoned in
the Hudson Yards rezoning, but not within 1,000 ft.
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land use uncertainty predicts in-sample zoning changes. In addition, I demonstrate that the proxy
for redevelopment motivated by Clapp and Salavei (2010) predicts in-sample redevelopments.
1.5.1 First Stage: Estimating Land Use Uncertainty
In the first stage, I run a multinomial logistic regression to capture the uncertainty regarding fu-
ture zoning designations. Table 1.3 presents summary statistics for the sample used for estimation,
while Table 1.4 presents coefficients and significance.
The main drivers of future land use uncertainty are the distributional characteristics of a lot’s
census tract with respect to land use, and how it differs from the lot’s community district (bor-
ough). For example, the variable %C|CTi,t−%C|CDi,t is defined as the percentage of lots zoned
commercial (C) in the census tract (CT) associated with lot i in year t, minus the percentage of
lots zoned commercial in the entire community district (CD) associated with lot i. To give a sense
of how granular these groupings of geographical area are, there are two hundred and thirty eight
census tracts the make up the borough of Manhattan, and fourteen community districts. Figure 1.4
shows the boroughs of Manhattan and Brooklyn broken into community districts (blue border),
and census tracts (black border). The idea is if the localized area surrounding a property has more
commercial lots than the larger geography, then the current lot is more likely to either be currently
commercially zoned or rezoned to commercial in the future. Coefficients of the deviation of both
the percentage of lots zoned as commercial or manufacturing in the census tract from the entire
borough are significant. Results show if the census tract is either more commercial or manufac-
turing than the borough, then lots in that tract are more likely to be rezoned as commercial or
manufacturing regardless of current zoning. This implies that commercial and manufacturing lots
tend to be clumped together away from residential lots.
22
Table 1.3: Summary statistics from first-stage estimation. %C|CT −%C|CD refers to the difference between the percentage of lots zoned
to commercial (C) in a lots specific census tract (CT) and the community district (CD). The same notation holds for manufacturing zoned
lots (M), and the borough (Boro). LotArea is the area of the lot. Age refers to the age of the building. LastAltered refers to the year the
building had its last major alteration. MetroTimeGCS is the estimated transit time to Grand Central Station.
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max
%C|CT −%C|CD 16,016,931 −0.00000 0.095 −0.813 −0.023 −0.004 0.940
%M |CT −%M |CD 16,016,931 −0.0001 0.123 −0.282 −0.039 −0.003 0.994
%C|CT −%C|Boro 16,016,931 −0.00005 0.123 −0.289 −0.022 −0.006 0.981
%M |CT −%M |Boro 16,016,931 −0.0001 0.133 −0.073 −0.041 −0.034 0.966
LotArea 16,016,931 4,132.826 29,613.590 17 1,914 2,967 9,218,615
Age 16,016,931 80.766 25.529 0.000 73.500 98.500 217.750
LastAltered 16,016,931 72.237 31.558 −0.500 52.500 94.500 216.750
MetroTimeGCS 16,016,931 15.814 5.599 0.070 12.050 19.888 40.207
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Other significant variables driving the propensity to be rezoned are the age of the structure, the
floor area ratio, the number of floors, the assessed value of the land, and the legislative dummies.
An interpretation can be difficult in the multinomial logit model, in which marginal effects are
computed by integrating over the exogenous variables. Results for Manhattan are presented in
Table 1.5, and for Brooklyn in Table 1.6.
For Manhattan, each percent deviation of commercial lots in the census tract to the borough
increases the propensity to be commercially zoned by almost 0.6% and decreases the probability
of being residential by nearly the same amount. It does not appear to have a statistically significant
effect on the propensity to be manufacturing. Each percentage point deviation of manufacturing
zoned lots from the borough increases the likelihood to be zoned commercial by 0.02%, manufac-
turing by 0.028%, and residential by 0.05%. Older buildings increase the likelihood of residential
or manufacturing and decrease the likelihood of being commercially zoned. Taller buildings are
decrease the likelihood of being zoned for manufacturing. A ten percent increase in the assessed
value of the land increases the propensity to be commercial by 0.6% and decreases the likelihood
of being zoned residential by 0.056%.
The legislative variables have a significant impact. Having a certified ULURP application in-
creased the likelihood of being commercial by 32%, decreased the change of being manufacturing
by roughly 3%, and decreased the likelihood of being residentially zoned by 29%. Also how the
community board weighs in on the zoning application also has a statistically significant impact.
Applications for which the community board is a majority in favor of the proposed zoning change
are 21.9% less likely to be commercial in the future, 2.75% more likely to be manufacturing, and
19.2% more likely to be residential.
After running the estimation, the land use propensities are generated by simply taking the
model prediction for each classification. Then the base case is simply unity minus the sum of all
imputed values.
1.5.2 Do Land Use Propensities Predict Zoning Changes?
Now that land use propensities for each tax lot have been generated, I test whether our generated
propensities are predictive of zoning changes. Since I have a limited sample to work with and the
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Table 1.4: Results of the first-stage choice model of land use designation two years into the future.
The sample includes all lots from both Manhattan & Brooklyn for years 2003-2015. %C|CT −
%C|CD refers to the deviation of % properties zoned (C)ommercial ((M)anufacturing) in the
census tract from the community district %C|CT − %C|Boro refers to the respective deviation
but from the borough. CertDum is a dummy variable which is one if a ULURP application for a
zoning change is in progress and it is certified. ResComDum is a dummy that is equal to one if a
ULURP application is in progress and the residential community board approved of the application.
Land Use
C M
%C|CT −%C|CD 0.225 0.775
%M |CT −%M |CD -0.449 -5.421∗∗∗
%C|CT −%C|Boro 6.322∗∗∗ 4.884∗∗∗















∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
25
Table 1.5: Marginal effects for propensity to be rezoned commercial (C), manufacturing (M), and
residential (R) in Manhattan based on the first-stage regression for years 2003-2015. Marginal
effects are computed by integrating over observed values of regressors, and the t-statistics are
computed using the delta-method. t-statistics in parenthesis.
C M R
%C|CT −%C|CD 0.0119 0.0141 -0.0260
(0.16) (1.17) (-0.32)
%M|CT −%M|CD 0.0357 -0.116∗∗∗ 0.0800
(0.42) (-4.14) (0.90)
%C|CT −%C|Boro 0.593∗∗∗ 0.0135 -0.606∗∗∗
(9.81) (1.35) (-9.17)
%C|CT −%M|Boro 0.219∗ 0.288∗∗∗ -0.507∗∗∗
(1.91) (13.31) (-4.39)
LogLotArea -0.0607∗ 0.0155∗∗∗ 0.0452
(-1.95) (4.03) (1.45)
Age -0.000785∗∗∗ 0.0000444∗∗ 0.000741∗∗∗
(-5.58) (2.12) (5.77)
LastAltered -0.0000115 0.00000918 0.00000236
(-0.14) (0.55) (0.03)
FAR 0.00349 0.00143∗∗∗ -0.00492∗
(1.29) (2.88) (-1.68)
LogBldgArea -0.0369∗ 0.00668 0.0303
(-1.75) (1.61) (1.40)
NumFloors -0.0000150 -0.00278∗∗∗ 0.00280
(-0.01) (-3.30) (1.56)
LogAssessLand 0.0614∗∗∗ -0.00510 -0.0563∗∗∗
(7.16) (-1.10) (-8.46)
CertDum 0.316∗∗∗ -0.0255∗ -0.291∗∗∗
(5.86) (-1.80) (-6.44)
ResComDum -0.219∗∗ 0.0275∗∗ 0.192∗∗
(-2.50) (2.17) (2.26)
t-statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.6: Marginal effects for propensity to be rezoned commercial (C), manufacturing (M), and
residential (R) in Brooklyn based on the first-stage regression for years 2003-2015. Marginal
effects are computed by integrating over observed values of regressors, and the t-statistics are
computed using the delta-method.
C M R
%C|CT −%C|CD -0.0533 0.0161 0.0372
(-0.49) (0.25) (0.34)
%M|CT −%M|CD -0.0130 -0.117∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗
(-0.41) (-5.46) (4.78)
%C|CT −%C|Boro 0.251∗∗ 0.0262 -0.278∗∗∗
(2.41) (0.39) (-2.68)
%M|CT −%M|Boro 0.0327 0.269∗∗∗ -0.302∗∗∗
(1.18) (13.25) (-11.14)
LogLotArea -0.0123∗∗ 0.00958∗∗∗ 0.00272
(-2.51) (4.03) (0.40)
Age 0.0000464 0.0000970∗ -0.000143∗∗
(1.02) (1.93) (-2.11)
LastAltered -0.0000520∗∗ -0.0000370∗∗ 0.0000889∗∗∗
(-2.43) (-2.39) (3.22)
LotFrontage 0.0000260∗∗∗ -0.00000757 -0.0000185
(2.90) (-0.86) (-1.31)
NumFloors -0.00521∗∗∗ -0.0141∗∗∗ 0.0193∗∗∗
(-2.83) (-7.39) (5.98)
LogAssessLand 0.0130∗∗∗ 0.00337∗∗∗ -0.0164∗∗∗
(8.70) (3.01) (-8.08)
MetroTime -0.000585∗∗∗ -0.000137 0.000722∗∗∗
(-3.43) (-1.22) (3.33)
CertDum 0.00476 -0.0557∗∗∗ 0.0510∗∗∗
(0.75) (-3.29) (2.66)
ResComDum -0.00280 -0.0141 0.0169
(-0.97) (-0.98) (1.10)
t-statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure 1.4: The boroughs of Manhattan and Brooklyn with the boundaries that community districts
in blue (thick), and census tracts in black (thin). The census tracts are nested in the community
districts, and the community districts within the borough. Manhattan is in the north and Brooklyn
is in the south, each separated by the East River.
zoning process is highly persistent, I see if I can explain the probability that a zoning change occurs
during the sample with zoning propensities at the beginning of the sample.
To determine if our generated land use propensities are actually predictive of zoning changes,
I create a dummy variable, Di, that is equal to unity if a lot has a different zoning designation in
2017 than it did in 2002, and zero otherwise. I remove the few lots that have gone through two or
more rezonings over the sample to avoid the case where a lot switched to a new designation and
then switched back to their original designation.
We regress Di,t on what I define to be the transition propensity at the beginning of the sample,





where Zi,2002 is the zoning designation of lot i in 2002.
For example, for a manufacturing zoned lot, the transition propensity is the sum of that lot’s
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propensity to be commercial or residential. I run a separate regression for each zoning designation,
and also include a specification with census tract fixed effects. Table 1.7 presents results.
Regressions (1) - (3) show the estimation results. All results show that transition propensities
are positively correlated with a zoning change occurring throughout our sample, and all results
are statistically significant at the 0.1% significance level. For commercial, manufacturing, and
residential, respectively, a one percentage point increase in the transition propensity translates into
an increased probability of being rezoned by 0.223%, 0.112%, and 0.19%. Including census tract
level fixed effects does not hinder the effect, and for commercial and residential, it makes the
effect much stronger. This suggests that even within a census-tract, the transition propensities help
to distinguish which buildings will transition.
1.5.3 Does Land Share of Assessed Value Predict Redevelopments?
It is imperative that I test if the land share of assessed value, our proposed proxy motivated
by Clapp and Salavei (2010), predicts redevelopments in our sample. Since redevelopments occur
over a very long cycle, I opt to do an experiment similar to the prior experiment by testing whether
propensities predicted observed zoning changes. I create a dummy variable,Ri, indicating whether
or not a redevelopment has occurred throughout the entire sample. A redevelopment here is defined
as either as a major renovation or a construction project that alters the size or egress of a structure.
We then regressRi on five dummies representing which quintile of land share of assessed value
the property falls into. Results are presented in Table 1.8.
Regression (1), the baseline, shows all coefficients are statistically significant, and there is
roughly a 10 percentage point increase in the probability of redevelopment going form the bottom
quintile to the top quintile. Controlling for age and the remaining FAR the property owner is
legally allowed to add on to the building does not take away the effect of our proxy, although it
does dampen it a bit. The difference between the top and bottom quintile decreases to roughly 7
percentage points. Age has a non-linear impact on the probability of redevelopment, reaching an
inflection point at around 60 years. This implies that after 60 years of operation, the benefit from
having a ‘historic’ building outweighs redevelopment. Instead, property owners likely invest in the
upkeep of their property little-by-little each year to stave off depreciation. Remaining FAR is also
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Table 1.7: Regressions (1)-(3) show results from regressing a dummy indicator whether or not a
zoning change occurred during the sample on transition propensities at the beginning of the sample
defined as the sum or propensities to be a zoning designation other than the lot’s current designa-
tion, for lots zoned commercial, manufacturing, and residential respectively at the beginning of the
sample. Regressions (4)-(6) include census tract fixed effects.










Constant -0.0252∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗ 0.00128∗∗∗ -0.0973∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗ -0.000256∗
Tract FE - - - Yes Yes Yes
N 15,338 12,508 260,349 15,325 12,498 260,347
adj. R2 0.075 0.011 0.002 0.575 0.737 0.164
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 1.8: Regressions (1)-(4) predict redevelopment over the sample on quintile dummies of
assessed land value as a percentage of assessed total value. Regression (1) presents baseline results.
Regression (2) controls for a quadratic term in the age of the structure as well the remaining
designated FAR permitted by the New York City Zoning Resolution (FAR Remaining). Regression
(3) includes community district fixed effects, and Regression (4) includes census tract fixed effects.
The bottom row F-statistics are from a test that the coefficients on all five quintiles are equal to one
another.
Ri (1) (2) (3) (4)
Q1 0.0687∗∗∗ 0.00813∗ 0.225∗∗∗ 0.0603
(0.00143) (0.00340) (0.0112) (0.0390)
Q2 0.0733∗∗∗ 0.0115∗∗ 0.243∗∗∗ 0.0794∗
(0.00143) (0.00366) (0.0113) (0.0390)
Q3 0.0793∗∗∗ 0.0154∗∗∗ 0.249∗∗∗ 0.0896∗
(0.00143) (0.00374) (0.0113) (0.0390)
Q4 0.102∗∗∗ 0.0331∗∗∗ 0.262∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗
(0.00143) (0.00376) (0.0113) (0.0390)
Q5 0.165∗∗∗ 0.0785∗∗∗ 0.290∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗
(0.00143) (0.00382) (0.0112) (0.0390)
Age 0.000718∗∗∗ 0.00104∗∗∗ 0.000910∗∗∗
(0.0000928) (0.0000943) (0.000102)
Age2 -0.00000161∗ -0.00000823∗∗∗ -0.00000771∗∗∗
(0.000000664) (0.000000680) (0.000000719)
CD FE - - Yes -
Tract FE - - - Yes
adj. R2 0.111 0.120 0.141 0.153
F(4,·) 777.56∗∗∗ 377.48∗∗∗ 207.96∗∗∗ 190.44∗∗∗
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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statistically significant, with each additional floor that is allowed to be added on to the redeveloped
building increasing the odds of redevelopment by 2 percentage points. Lastly, regressions (3)-(4)
add community district, and census tract fixed effects respectively, and they do not seem to hinder
our proxy’s ability to predict redevelopment.
1.5.4 Hedonic Regression
Next, a hedonic model is estimated by regressing the logarithm of sale price per square feet on
various property characteristics. The advantage of defining intensity as in Equation 14 is that it is
increasing in option value; the greater percentage of the total value of the property is due to the
land, the higher the option value should be. And when intensity is equal to zero – the land is not
valued – it can be interpreted as if there is no option value to redevelop.
For years 2003-2015, I have complete data for 9,853 transactions in Manhattan, excluding
condominium sales, which make up the majority of residential transactions in Manhattan. I have
105,047 transactions for Brooklyn. Summary statistics for the estimation sample are presented in
Table 1.9 and Table 1.10 respectively.
32
Table 1.9: Summary statistics for hedonic regression of Manhattan; 2003-2015.
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
SaleSqFt 680.92 947.32 1.96 35,416.67
LotArea 3,862.48 4,812.18 320 58,24
Age 95.23 19.23 1.75 119.75
p(C) .2812 .3353 .0013 .9959
p(M) .0703 .1952 .0001 .9859
p(R) .6483 .3868 .0030 .9983
AssessTotalSqFt 49.73 64.94 .490929 2,163
FloorArea 3,509.80 8,691.54 130 359,251
NumFloors 5.104 4.26 1 63
LastAltered 43.94 52.95 -12.25 119.75
ExemptTotalSqFt 2.62 13.55 0 373.60
MetroTimeGCS 9.969675 6.47 .07 26.2
LSA .4008 .2324 .0121 .9911
Observations 5,276
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Table 1.10: Summary statistics for hedonic regression of Brooklyn; 2003-2015.
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
SaleSqFt 290.48 194.77 9.6153 2,854.33
LotArea 2,676.87 4,256.58 340 362,142
Age 88.11 24.04 .5 118
p(C) .0189 .0726 1.40e-15 .9999
p(M) .0398 .1491 1.33e-32 .9999
p(R) .9412 .1650 3.77e-06 1
AssessTotalSqFt 11.80 12.46 .1425 499.36
FloorArea 1,570.58 2,755.36 80 146,300
NumFloors 2.4555 .8697 1 75
ExemptTotalSqFt 1.1238 4.51 0 239.59
MetroTimeGCS 16.3896 4.56 2.81 28.65
LSA .3985 .2384 .0068 .9906
Observations 35,253
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Regression results from the hedonic model estimation for both Manhattan and Brooklyn are
presented in Table 1.11.
The regression specification above regresses the logarithm of the transaction price per gross
square foot on land share of assessed value (LSA) interacted with land use propensities, as well as
the logarithm of the total assessed value per gross square foot. The LSA terms reflect the option
value to redevelop into each use, while the total assessed value terms are interacted to allow for
the possibility that changes in the future expected zoning of an area might also impact real estate
values through the existing building characteristics.
Ignoring the interaction terms, the elasticity of prices with respect to the land share of assessed
value is βLSA − βAVLSA . As a building depreciates, the land share of assessed value increases. The
coefficient on LSA, βLSA, is thus the impact on prices through the option value to redevelop as
a building depreciates. This first-order effect is offset by the effect of the building depreciating
on the total assessed value inversely proportional to the land share of assessed value. This loss of
value from depreciation is most severe when the land share of assessed value is low (or when the
building is most valuable).
All coefficients on the LSA term are significant at the 5% level with the exception of the p(r)
term for Manhattan (which is significant at the 10% level) and the p(c) term for Brooklyn. For
both boroughs, option value is most sensitive to propensities to be zoned commercial, followed by
manufacturing and residential.
1.5.5 Discussion: Option Value to Redevelop Across Space
Table 1.12 and Table 1.13 present how option value varies across the entire sample for Man-
hattan and Brooklyn respectively. The mean option value in Manhattan is 20% of total value, and
it is broken down into 28% related to commercial development, 8.5% manufacturing, and 66.3%
residential. The option value to redevelop has a standard deviation of 10 percentage points. Lots in
Brooklyn have far less option value, with a mean of 8.5% and standard deviation of 4.7 percentage
points. Much of Brooklyn’s option value is attributed to residential development, with only 1%
going to commercial and 4.4% being attributed to manufacturing.
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Table 1.11: Hedonic estimation results from Manhattan and Brooklyn from the identified subsam-
ple. LSA is the land share of assessed value, and p(z) corresponds to the land use propensities.





β / SE β / SE
p(c) × LSA 0.851∗∗∗ 0.439
(0.161) (0.446)
p(m) × LSA 0.698∗∗∗ 0.423∗∗
(0.217) (0.166)
p(r) × LSA 0.221∗ 0.222∗∗∗
(0.128) (0.036)












Controls × Year Yes Yes




Table 1.12: Summary statistics for option value in Manhattan
All Properties N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max
OV /Total Value 9,853 0.200 0.100 0.007 0.119 0.275 0.455
OV C/OV 9,853 0.280 0.308 0.00000 0.022 0.438 0.995
OV M/OV 9,853 0.085 0.207 0.000 0.004 0.037 0.987
OV R/OV 9,853 0.663 0.364 0.001 0.306 0.976 0.999
Commercial N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max
OV /Total Value 3,040 0.191 0.084 0.013 0.123 0.251 0.426
OV C/OV 3,040 0.599 0.304 0.001 0.318 0.897 0.995
OV M/OV 3,040 0.085 0.158 0.00001 0.014 0.064 0.969
OV R/OV 3,040 0.352 0.331 0.001 0.060 0.685 0.993
Manufacturing N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max
OV /Total Value 746 0.218 0.092 0.014 0.143 0.288 0.444
OV C/OV 746 0.259 0.233 0.003 0.084 0.393 0.891
OV M/OV 746 0.647 0.281 0.005 0.425 0.885 0.987
OV R/OV 746 0.140 0.183 0.004 0.040 0.139 0.949
Residential N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max
OV /Total Value 6,067 0.202 0.107 0.007 0.114 0.286 0.455
OV C/OV 6,067 0.123 0.161 0.00000 0.013 0.184 0.965
OV M/OV 6,067 0.016 0.063 0.000 0.003 0.011 0.950
OV R/OV 6,067 0.883 0.162 0.019 0.840 0.985 0.999
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Table 1.13: Summary statistics for option value in Brooklyn.
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max
OV /Total Value 105,047 0.085 0.047 0.002 0.042 0.125 0.305
OV C/OV 105,047 0.010 0.044 0.000 0.002 0.007 0.793
OV M/OV 105,047 0.044 0.139 0.000 0.007 0.021 0.994
OV R/OV 105,047 0.948 0.144 0.001 0.975 0.990 1.000
Commercial N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max
OV /Total Value 1,949 0.071 0.044 0.003 0.035 0.102 0.255
OV C/OV 1,949 0.143 0.214 0.0001 0.012 0.172 0.793
OV M/OV 1,949 0.073 0.116 0.000 0.015 0.081 0.981
OV R/OV 1,949 0.792 0.243 0.017 0.712 0.969 1.000
Manufacturing N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max
OV /Total Value 3,918 0.105 0.061 0.003 0.055 0.146 0.305
OV C/OV 3,918 0.013 0.045 0.000 0.002 0.009 0.632
OV M/OV 3,918 0.529 0.371 0.0004 0.141 0.930 0.994
OV R/OV 3,918 0.471 0.366 0.001 0.074 0.851 0.999
Residential N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max
OV /Total Value 99,180 0.084 0.047 0.002 0.042 0.125 0.274
OV C/OV 99,180 0.008 0.027 0.000 0.002 0.006 0.766
OV M/OV 99,180 0.025 0.071 0.000 0.007 0.019 0.974
OV R/OV 99,180 0.970 0.075 0.025 0.977 0.990 1.000
38
Table 1.14 and Table 1.15 exhibit how the breakdown of option value varies across demo-
graphic factors. On the racial dimension, the higher percent Asian a census tract is, the more the
redevelopment option is a fraction of total value in Manhattan. In contrast, the more African-
American a neighborhood, the more the option value to redevelop constitutes total property value.
Neighborhoods that are the least Asian have option values of 10.64% for commercial, 1.77% man-
ufacturing, and 88.77% residential, while neighborhoods that are the most Asian have redevel-
opment rates of 57.71% for commercial, 18.75% manufacturing, and 26.43% residential. The
distribution of the least African-American census tracts is 40.43% commercial, 9.17% manufac-
turing, and 54.25% residential. The census tracts which are most African-American have nearly
all residential value; the breakdown is 9.51% commercial, 3.73% manufacturing, and 87.72% res-
idential.
One may think the racial breakdown may be related to income. When looking at the same
breakdown but for median household income in Manhattan, it is very similar to the breakdown
for Asian census tracts. The least Asian neighborhoods have a similar option value to the lowest
income census tracts, while the most Asian look very close to the highest income quartile. How-
ever, the top quartile of African-American census tracts has more variation than income dynamics
might suggest. The top quartile of African-American tracts have more redevelopment option value
than the lowest income bracket, and the option value itself is attributed 3% more to residential
development. They both have extremely little manufacturing potential.
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Table 1.14: A breakdown of option value across various demographics for Manhattan. Q1 refers
to the bottom quartile of census tracts, which contains the smallest 25% of values. Q4 is then the
quartile of 25% largest of values. The first row shows the percentage of estimated property value
that is attributed to total option value. The bottom three rows then break down the distribution of
how optional value is related to the propensity of each property to be categorized as each land use.
All demographic information is on the census tract level. GCT refers to Grand Central Station.
Percent African American Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Option Value as % of Property Value 20.39 18.96 17.66 16.19
% Commercial 40.43 45.36 39.99 9.51
% Manufacturing 9.17 15.50 8.38 3.73
% Residential 54.25 42.93 54.60 87.72
Percent Asian Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Option Value as % of Property Value 16.02 20.92 18.55 17.58
% Commercial 10.64 24.24 42.36 57.71
% Manufacturing 1.77 7.75 8.74 18.75
% Residential 88.77 71.84 52.23 26.73
Median Age Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Option Value as % of Property Value 16.63 17.11 19.10 20.14
% Commercial 34.28 32.12 31.65 37.33
% Manufacturing 12.04 11.15 8.69 5.49
% Residential 55.95 59.35 63.10 60.37
Median Household Income Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Option Value as % of Property Value 14.92 18.61 19.81 19.68
% Commercial 15.12 31.48 42.52 45.38
% Manufacturing 1.14 8.54 8.46 18.98
% Residential 84.57 62.79 53.21 39.31
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Percent Renters Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Option Value as % of Property Value 20.22 19.63 18.31 14.94
% Commercial 37.74 38.37 32.74 26.59
% Manufacturing 12.72 11.73 7.29 5.52
% Residential 53.14 53.58 62.61 69.53
Percent w/ Bachelor’s Degree or Higher Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Option Value as % of Property Value 14.38 18.52 20.50 19.62
% Commercial 15.12 38.69 37.60 43.52
% Manufacturing 1.21 8.43 15.17 12.28
% Residential 84.44 55.67 51.44 47.95
Metro Time to GCT Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Option Value as % of Property Value 21.13 20.91 18.06 19.84
% Commercial 34.80 26.64 20.34 30.25
% Manufacturing 12.01 6.74 5.97 9.38
% Residential 57.05 69.29 75.42 63.41
Education also has similar option value characteristics as median household income. At the
top of the income and education bracket, the quartile of tracts with the highest degree earners has
6% more option value associated with residential redevelopment and 10% more residential.
Tracts with more renters have a lower amount of option value and have less of the option value
devoted to commercial use, less to manufacturing, and more to residential.
Median age of the households in the census tract seems to have a positive correlation with
option value. The older the residents of the neighborhood, the more option value there is, likely
due to higher incomes.
The changes to option value in Brooklyn are not as drastic as in Manhattan. There is far less
variation in option value. This may have to do with the fact that the majority of option value in
Brooklyn is associated with residential. More research needs to be done on what is driving the
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Table 1.15: A breakdown of option value across various demographics for Brooklyn. Q1 refers
to the bottom quartile of census tracts, which contains the smallest 25% of values. Q4 is then the
quartile of 25% largest of values. The first row shows the percentage of estimated property value
that is attributed to total option value. The bottom three rows then break down the distribution of
how optional value is related to the propensity of each property to be categorized as each land use.
All demographic information is on the census tract level. GCT refers to Grand Central Station.
Percent African American Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Option Value as % of Property Value 11.46 11.13 11.43 12.09
% Commercial 0.85 1.27 1.36 0.68
% Manufacturing 3.11 7.46 4.38 2.19
% Residential 96.37 91.74 94.60 97.42
Percent Asian Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Option Value as % of Property Value 12.06 11.67 11.20 11.19
% Commercial 1.02 0.91 1.22 1.03
% Manufacturing 3.68 5.07 5.30 3.21
% Residential 95.64 94.36 93.90 96.11
Median Age Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Option Value as % of Property Value 11.70 11.32 11.42 11.66
% Commercial 1.66 1.11 0.75 0.66
% Manufacturing 6.50 5.32 3.70 1.83
% Residential 92.30 93.97 95.87 97.77
Median Household Income Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Option Value as % of Property Value 11.65 11.57 11.66 11.23
% Commercial 1.52 0.84 0.71 1.11
% Manufacturing 4.46 4.54 4.10 4.14
% Residential 94.44 94.99 95.52 95.08
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results from Brooklyn.
1.5.6 Discussion: Option Value Across Time
Figure 1.5 and Figure 1.6 show how the option value to redevelop as a percentage of total esti-
mated value has changed each year for Manhattan and Brooklyn respectively. A visual inspection
gives creedance to the idea that the option value to redevelop is acyclical. For both Manhattan and
Brooklyn, I see option value decrease from 2003-2008, when the great financial crisis hit. From
2008-2010, there is a drastic increase in option value. Once NYC real estate starts to boom again
from 2010-2015, I also see a decrease in the option value to redevelop.
This is consistent with Grenadier (1996), which finds that development cascades can occur in
periods where there is a downturn in demand for real estate services. As rents from real estate
decline during an economic downturn, the opportunity cost introduced from the lost rent during
a redevelopment decreases. Landlords then have greater incentive to exercise the redevelopment
option, as they can earn even more rents once the recession ends and the property is improved.
1.6 Conclusion
We ask how the option value to redevelop is related to land use restrictions, and how the re-
development value is related to various demographic and building characteristics. A dataset is
constructed that captures land use changes, property transactions, building characteristics, demo-
graphics, and economic information for all properties and census tracts in New York City from
2002-2017.
43
Figure 1.5: Option value to redevelop of a percent of total value over time for Manhattan.
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Using a two-stage estimation procedure, propensities to be zoned to either residential, com-
mercial, or manufacturing land uses are interacted with the ratio of assessed land to total assessed
value of the property. This ratio proxies for the propensity to be redeveloped.
We find evidence that all option value terms are statistically significant. I estimate the the
average option value in Manhattan for years 2003-2015 is 20% of total estimated value, and I
estimate that it is 8.5% in Brooklyn. In a sense, Furthermore, the option value broken down by
the potential to develop into different land uses shows clear correlations with race, income, and
education. Lastly, I present evidence that the option value to redevelop is counter-cyclical with the
real estate cycle.
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Figure 1.6: Option value to redevelop of a percent of total value over time for Brooklyn.
46
CHAPTER 2
MACRO FUNDAMENTALS AND COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE PRICE DYNAMICS
Joint with Jacob Sagi
2.1 Introduction
Commercial real estate (CRE) can be loosely defined as real estate held for the purpose of deriv-
ing income (through rental profits) and capital gains. This includes leased space in the residential
(apartment), office, industrial, and retail sectors, among others. Although publicly traded portfo-
lios of commercial real estate comprise less than 5% of the overall stock market, the asset class
represents roughly 15% of the private equity universe.1 The latter figure is commensurate with
recommendations for “optimal” portfolio allocation and is arguably consistent with its substan-
tial share of the overall economy.2 Despite its size, the relationship of CRE with macroeconomic
fundamentals does not appear to be well-understood. For instance, while the impact of monetary
policy on residential real estate prices has been well-studied (Iacoviello 2005), to our knowledge
the same is not true of commercial real estate. In this paper, we attempt to better pin-down how
commercial real estate prices and fundamentals are influenced by macro fundamentals: growth,
inflation, and nominal interest rates. We do this in a structural framework that is consistent with
a rational expectations equilibrium (REE) in which investors set prices by attempting to anticipate
1The first figure comes from https://www.reit.com/investing/investor-resources/gics-classification-real-estate who
cite S&P Dow Jones Indices and MSCI FactSet as the source for the data, and the second figure comes from The rise
and rise of private markets: McKinsey Private Markets Review’.
2In their 2019 annual release of the Financial Accounts of the United States, the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System reports that there is more than $50 Trillion dollars worth of real estate in the United States. Of this,
just over 50% correspond to owner-occupied residential assets. Because CRE is primarily held by private actors, it
is hard to estimate how much of it there is. A rule of thumb used by some practitioners is that the stock of assets in
developed countries that is comparable to CRE held by large institutional investors amounts to roughly half of GDP
(see PGIM Real Estate’s A Bird’s Eye View of Real Estate Markets: 2017 Update). It is further estimated that only
one third of that amount is actually held by large institutional investors. In the US, this would amount to a stock of $9
Trillion of which $3 Trillion would already be held by large institutional investors.
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the impact of structural changes in macro fundamentals on real estate cash flow fundamentals and
discount rates. We find that, based on their cash flow and price characteristics, CRE assets and
secured loans are profoundly sensitive to macro fundamentals (both output growth and inflation)
and structural breaks in the relationship between these fundamentals. There are multiple reasons
why this is important for policy makers, lenders, investors, and consumers.
2.1.1 Why is this research question important?
To understand why a better grasp of the relationship between macro-fundamentals and CRE
prices is of keen interest to policy makers, it is useful to recall that a major devaluation in CRE
prices played a key role in the Savings and Loan crisis of the late 1980s and early 1990s. The
Federal Government’s response to the massive systemic bank failures stemming in large measure
from non-performing CRE loans was the creation of the Resolution Trust Corporation, whose goal
was the orderly liquidation of collateral from non-performing loans. Concern about the risk of sim-
ilar contagion, and the need for better understanding of CRE price dynamics, recently prompted
the President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston to say (remarking specifically about CRE)
that “...for almost any asset category, positive trends can sometimes evolve into prices that in-
crease more than fundamentals justify. It is very hard to distinguish how much of the price gain
is the result of the favorable fundamentals, and how much reflects an abundance of optimism by
investors.”3 Because the approach we take to examining relationships between fundamentals and
prices is consistent with a REE, we are better able to distinguish prolonged periods when prices are
not consistent with fundamentals as well as conduct counterfactual experiments. Indeed, our model
estimates imply a historically large departure of commercial real estate prices from fundamentals
starting in early 2006 and peaking around mid-2007.
Correspondingly, lending institutions whose financing is heavily influenced by regulatory and
monetary policy hold a great deal of debt collateralized by CRE (either explicitly or implicitly).
The relationship of this collateral value to funding costs is clearly of vital interest to such institu-
tions, especially when it comes to assessing portfolio risk. Our modeling framework can be used
3The quote is taken from a May 9, 2017 speech by Eric S. Rosengren, “Trends in Commercial Real Estate”,
addressing conference attendees at NYU.
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to quantify the risk associated with well-diversified CRE portfolios over arbitrary horizons. For
more context, consider that roughly $4 Trillion of lending is directly secured to CRE.4 This only
accounts for loans directly secured to CRE and likely understates the lending market’s exposure
to CRE because real estate forms the bulk of many business entities’ tangible assets, and senior
unsecured lending has an implicit claim on the unencumbered portion of such assets.5. It is also
worth mentioning that CRE mortgages are disproportionately held by regional banks — CRE loans
represent 35% (8%) of all loans for banks with assets under $10B (greater than $1T) — suggesting
that shocks to this asset class could propagate quickly in the real economy.6
It is likely self-evident that investors care about the above-discussed issues facing policy mak-
ers and lenders . Beyond that, some practitioners view real estate investments as hybrid fixed-
income securities. A particularly vivid yet somewhat anecdotal example for this is the so-called
“taper tantrum” episode in the late Spring of 2013, when the US Federal Reserve Chairman Ben
Bernanke announced the Fed’s intention to unwind quantitative easing. The announcement is al-
leged to have affected real estate investment trusts (REITs) more negatively than other stocks, and
REITs lost more ground relative to non-REIT stocks as the economy continued to improve that
Summer and the Fed re-iterated its intentions.7 Some practitioners also argue that real estate in-
vestments provide a good hedge against inflation. The argument typically given is that as overall
prices are increased, rents too will be escalated. Academics, on the other hand, have struggled
to find a simple relationship between real estate prices and interest rates or inflation (E.g., see
Hartzell, Hekman, and Miles 1987; Liu, Hartzell, and Hoesli 1997; Peyton 2009). Efforts to link
4This figure comes from Table L.217 of the Financial Accounts Guide published by the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System. It includes “non-residential commercial” and multi-family (rental apartment) real estate
assets.
5See Tuzel (2010); Cvijanović (2014).
6This figure comes from an industry publication, the Yardi Matrix Bulletin (July 2018), titled “Regional/Local
Banks Eat More of the Commercial Mortgage Pie: When is Enough?”.
7To our knowledge, there is no definitive proof of a causal link between the Fed announcements and REIT returns
over this period. One attempt at this is Lee (2016).
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these variables have been confined to linear regressions without economic constraints on how fun-
damentals interrelate. Our paper contributes to this literature by re-visiting these questions within
a REE-consistent framework that is able to reflect structural changes in the relationship between
CRE prices and macro fundamentals.
In equilibrium, residential housing values are linked to the rental market, and thus commercial
real estate. This is because renting and owning are (imperfect) substitutes for satisfying demand
for housing services. The implication is that valuations in the two markets cannot be decoupled.
Thus an understanding of CRE price dynamics does carry over to helping understand housing price
dynamics, and consequently consumer household wealth. An important challenge in this literature,
however, is the lack of key data. While an impressively large time-series panel of house prices is
readily available, such data cannot be easily complemented with underlying cash flows.8 An ad-
vantage of working with CRE is the potential availability of both cash flow and prices. By using
cash flow data to help pin down price movements, one may be better able to tie down the rela-
tionship between prices and fundamentals. To the extent that such relationships qualitatively carry
over from residential CRE to owner-occupied homes, our work is also relevant to the literature on
consumer and household finance.
2.1.2 Paper synopsis
We estimate a model that combines two important economic features: (i) The feedback
between short-term interest rates, inflation, expected inflation, and the output gap; and (ii) “No-
arbitrage” dynamic asset-pricing in which current prices correspond to discounted future cash flow.
In the model, the discount rate varies with the nominal rate and time-varying risk premium, while
cash flow growth rates vary with inflation and the output gap. Prices combine the two in a highly
non-linear and forward-looking fashion. In particular, the relationship between the three macro
variables can structurally change and such changes are anticipated in prices. Finally, time-varying
cash flow volatility influences prices through Jensen’s inequality.
To model structural shocks that could (but need not be) interpreted as monetary policy shifts,
8Researchers may use “imputed rent” to substitute for actual cash flow but, even beyond the obvious measurement
error, this does not net out renovations and additions.
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we employ a variant of the model used by Bikbov and Chernov (2013). They reason that combining
a REE-consistent monetary policy model with observed bond prices can lead to improved identi-
fication of both model parameters and monetary policy regimes.9 By adding other asset prices
to the estimation, together with corresponding cash flows, we are able to simultaneously estimate
structural regimes, cash flow (and price) sensitivity to macro variables across regimes, and pricing
errors. The linking of prices to fundamentals (macro variables and cash flow) permits an analysis
where one can point to periods where the former depart from the latter.
We are led to the suspicion that structural regime changes might be important to understanding
CRE prices by the following fact. A regression of the ten-year treasury yield on inflation exhibits
a regime break between data from the 1990’s and the following period (the regression coefficient
roughly halves in going from the earlier to the later period). Moreover, average CRE income yields,
known as capitalization rates or “cap rates”, co-moved very little with treasury bond yields and
inflation in the earlier period, but the co-movement became large and highly significant afterwards
(positive for bond yields and negative for inflation).10 In a Gordon-Williams growth model, cap
rates are equal to the difference between discount and income growth rates. If real estate income
growth co-moves strongly with inflation then whenever discount rates are also highly sensitive to
inflation (e.g., a “Hawkish” monetary policy regime) the discount and growth effects wash out and
cap rates would be less sensitive to moves in inflation or yields. When discount rates are relatively
insensitive to inflation (e.g., a “Dovish” monetary policy regime), the same reasoning would predict
for cap rates a positive sensitivity to interest rates and a negative sensitivity to inflation. While
the former intuition may be appealing in explaining why cap rates were insensitive to interest
rates and inflation before 2000 and highly sensitive afterwards, it is somewhat ad-hoc in selecting
only a single regime break-point. Another cause for concern is that the intuition above builds on
the Gordon-Williams growth model which is inherently static, while a structural break process is
9Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) and Bianchi (2013) also find strong evidence of regimes in monetary policy.
10A break point can be found in 2000q4 via a supremum Wald test. Bianchi (2013) estimates a more sophisti-
cated model that suggests a monetary policy regime change in 1999Q3. The two dates yield similar results for the
relationship between treasury bond yields, inflation, and cap rates.
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dynamic. If CRE prices react to monetary policy, then it must be that investors also anticipate
monetary policy and that this feeds back into CRE prices (i.e., cap rates). The only way to test
and measure this is to estimate a dynamic model of macro fundamentals and asset prices in which
investors anticipate future structural changes. This is what we attempt to do in this paper.
The model of macro fundamentals that we use can be viewed as a regime-switching VAR
with constraints on the coefficients that arise from REE considerations.11 We allow for structural
changes in the sensitivity of interest rates to inflation and the output gap. Likewise, we allow
interest rate volatility to exhibit regimes.
We model real estate income fundamentals as depending contemporaneously on inflation, the
output gap, and lagged income. Given such a dependence, the monetary policy model pins down
discount rate dynamics and therefore the present value of cash flows (i.e., prices). We use income
and price data from three large real state asset portfolios consisting of apartment, office, and indus-
trial assets. In addition, as in Bikbov and Chernov (2013), we use price data on 2-, 5-, and 10-year
treasury strips. Our maximum likelihood estimation finds the set of model parameters that best
links prices to fundamentals while fitting the joint dynamics of macro fundamentals.
Our model is able to fit bond prices with an error roughly comparable to that found in Bikbov
and Chernov (2013).12 Real estate asset pricing errors vary from 5% to 7%. Generally, we find
significant positive sensitivities to the output gap and inflation across all real estate asset cash flow.
An OLS analysis of real estate cash flow dependence on macro fundamentals yields similar results
for the output gap, but insignificant loadings on inflation. This highlights the disadvantage of
analyzing cash flow growth fundamentals without also including price information. It is important
to add that real estate income is generally positively associated with inflation using univariate
11In a REE, the output gap, inflation, and nominal rates depend on the expectations of consumers and market
participants for future output gap, inflation, and nominal rates. In other words, the VAR structure is augmented with
forward-looking components which must be integrated out. An arbitrary VAR will not necessarily correspond to a
REE, hence the need for constraints.
12Treasury bond pricing errors under the model that includes information from real estate portfolios are around
0.40%. Without the real estate portfolios ((i.e., the Bikbov and Chernov 2013, model)) the pricing error is around
0.26%. As seen in similar studies (e.g., Chiang, Hughen, and Sagi 2015), the fit to prices tends to erode with the
addition of more assets in the estimation. This is because, despite the addition of more model parameters, the same
basic fundamentals are required to explain a greater range of dynamics.
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measures of association but, because inflation and the output gap are positively correlated, in a
multivariate analysis the loading on inflation declines and may even turn negative.
In the estimated interest rate regimes, the sensitivity of rates to inflation and the output gap
are simultaneously positive and high or positive and low. These have natural interpretations as
monetary policy regimes where in one regime the Fed actively targets inflation and an overheated
economy, while in the other regime the Fed abstains from such targeting. The former regime can be
viewed as “active” (or “hawkish”) while the latter regime as “passive” (or “dovish”). Correspond-
ingly, we identify high and low interest rate volatility regimes which could represent, following
Bikbov and Chernov (2013), shifts between a flexible (or “loose”) versus “rigid” (or “tight”) im-
plementations of monetary policy.
If the estimated regimes are interpreted as monetary policy shifts, then one can use the model
to study the impact of monetary policy on real estate prices. Consistent with the intuition given
earlier, an active (passive) monetary policy would be associated with higher (lower) cap rates. In
the estimated model, real estate prices are lowest when monetary policy actively targets inflation
and an overheated economy, but the policy is only loosely or “flexibly” applied (leading to above-
average interest rate volatility). The mirror image situation — a passive regime targeting a low rate
and low rate volatility — exhibits the highest real estate prices. Model estimates are consistent with
the view that the last decade has been, on average, characterized by such a passive-rigid regime.
Thus a key model insight is that well-defined regime shocks can dramatically impact prices. For
instance, in expectation, moving from an active-flexible to a passive-rigid regime leads to a 100-
150 basis point decline in cap rates (and a corresponding large increase in prices). Moving the
other way leads to higher cap rates although the effect is (on average) a bit more muted.
Finally, we study the impact of regimes changes on mortgage spreads. Here too we find that
the most pronounced impact comes from a well-defined active/passive policy change, associated
with as much as a 100 basis point change in spreads of newly originated instruments and a 20%-
30% change in the value of existing loan portfolios. In summary, changes in regime, both those




2.2.1 Regime changes in monetary policy
Identifying structural breaks in macro fundamentals is not an easy task. Sims (2001) ar-
gues that by checking for parameter instability in single-equation models or reduced-form regres-
sions, economists are less likely to gain valuable economic insights because they are attempting to
draw inference from a misspecified model. Said differently, a well-specified model should include
the anticipatory influences. On the other hand, when estimating structural MS-DSGE models that
employs the rational expectations (RE) assumption, the estimated parameters tend to be poorly
identified.
There exists a large literature that attempts to answer the question, “did a change in the way
monetary policy was conducted during the 1980s contribute to the reduction in volatility of infla-
tion, & economic growth during that same period”. Clarida et al. (2000) (hence CGG) test for
instability of a forward-looking monetary policy rule in the spirit of Taylor (1993). The authors
find that prior to 1979:Q3, the US monetary authority’s response to changing inflation expectations
to be less than unity. During the the Volcker-Greenspan era, the authors find that the central bank
raised interest rate more than one-for-one with inflation expectations. Their findings suggest that
during Arthur Burns’ reign of chairman of the Fed was characterized by destabilizing monetary
policy that coincides with a period of a high volatility of economic fundamentals. In contrast to the
Burns era, the Volcker-Greenspan era was stabilizing and coincides with a period of low volatility
of economic fundamentals.
This paper is related to studies in the vein of CGG, that opt to use structural multivariate DGSE
models to capture monetary policy regime changes, as opposed to the single-equation used by
CGG. Early examples include Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) and Sims and Zha (2006).13
13In support of employing stochastic monetary policy regime changes, Sims and Zha (2006) write that “policy
changes, if they have occurred, have not been monotonic, and they have been difficult to detect. Both the rational
public in our models and econometricians must treat the changes in policy probabilistically, with a model of how and
when the shifts occur and with recognition of the uncertainty about their nature & timing.”
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2.2.2 Asset pricing and monetary policy
Rudebusch and Wu (2008) as well as Bekaert, Cho, and Moreno (2010) connect an affine
no-arbitrage model of the term structure of interest rates to a hybrid small-scale New-Keynesian
model similar to the one used in this paper but without allowing for multiple independent regimes.
Similarly, Bikbov and Chernov (2013) attempt to employ the term structure of interest rates to get
sharper estimates on a Markov-Switching New-Keynesian model allowing for the monetary policy
rule parameters, the volatility of the output gap & inflation, and the volatility of short-term nominal
interest rates to all switch independently of each other. The authors find the econometrician’s ex-
post probability of being in a given monetary policy regime is much sharper in the model that
includes select terms of the yield curve. Theirs is used as a starting point for our model, as it
addresses Sims (2001)’s concern that models of monetary policy that ignore heteroskedasticity
while allowing for parameter instability are prone to be spurious.
Also clearly related are recent attempts to connect bond and equity market price dynamics to
monetary policy. Campbell, Pflueger, and Viceira (2014) employ a New-Keynesian model to ex-
plain the time-variation in correlations between stock market and bond market returns. In their
model, agents do not anticipate possible regime changes in monetary policy. Song (2017) under-
takes a similar analysis by estimating a rational expectations model in which the monetary authority
changes between two policy regimes (active versus passive). While we, like Song (2017), work in
a REE framework, our model is reduced-form and additionally considers changes in the volatility
of interest rates (e.g., a rigid versus flexible policy regime).
2.2.3 Real estate and macro fundamentals
Plazzi, Torous, and Valkanov (2010) test predictions about CRE cap rate implied by the
Dynamic Gordon model of Campbell and Shiller (1988), which posits that the cap rate is a function
of the future expected path of returns, or future expected path of rental growth rates (i.e., cap rates
should predict future returns or future rent growth). In a cross-sectional analysis Plazzi et al.
(2010) find that certain classes of cap rates do predict either rental growths or future returns, but
the predictability is dependent on how returns co-vary with rental growth rates. In a related study,
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Plazzi, Torous, and Valkanov (2008) find that the cross-sectional dispersion of CRE cap rates is
related to macro fundamentals.
Using data from a US CRE fund, Hartzell et al. (1987) find that imputed quarterly portfolio
returns are positively related to both expected inflation and inflation shocks over the (highly in-
flationary) period 1974-1983. Perversely, securitized real estate (i.e., REITs) appear to have the
opposite relationship with inflation and there is some evidence that this difference is linked to
feedback with monetary policy (Liu et al. 1997).
2.3 Data & Basic Statistics
2.3.1 Data
We employ data from the US from years 1992:Q1 to 2014:Q2. The output gap is constructed
from a quadratic detrending of log real GDP per capita from FRED. We use the annual log-change
of personal consumption expenditure (PCE) obtained from FRED to instrument for inflation be-
cause it is widely believed that the FED targets this measures in setting its monetary policy.14
The continuously compounded annualized Fama-Bliss return on a 3-month ZCB is used for the
short-term rate of interest (the “short rate”).
Real estate (unlevered) property value and net operating income (NOI) growth data is from the
National Counsel of Real Estate Investment Fiduciaries (NCREIF) and corresponds to constituent
properties of the NCREIF Property Index. Each quarter, the NCREIF property data is aggregated
for three distinct real estate asset categories: Apartments, Industrial, and Office.15 Cap rates are
calculated for each quarter-category by dividing the aggregated property values reported for the
end of that quarter by the trailing four quarters of NOI (including the current quarter’s NOI).
Although cap rates are supposed to be forward-looking (i.e., employing expectations for next year’s
NOI), this number is not available and the discrepancy can be viewed as part of the estimated
14See https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20120125c.htm.
15Data for retail CRE properties are also available from the NCREIF. Because of highly variable standard errors
in estimates of the average NOI growth across the NCREIF retail properties portfolio, we elect not to use it in our
estimation.
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measurement error. Income growth is calculated from quarterly NOI.16 Although NCREIF data is
available as early as 1978q1, the number of properties is significantly smaller in the earlier period.
Figure 2.1 demonstrates that the data is quite noisy prior to the early 1990s. In our analysis we
employ data starting in 1992q1.
Figure 2.2 provides visual evidence for the substantial co-movement of cap rates across asset
categories. It is also clear that the cross-sectional dispersion of cap rates is time-varying suggesting
that the different asset categories have different sensitivities to macro-economic factors. Table 2.1
documents summary statistics for the panel variables before and after the monetary policy regime
break identified in Bianchi (2013). The νi’s denote income growth rates while the ci’s denote
cap rates (i.e., earnings yields). The subscripts A, I , and O respectively denote “apartments”,
“industrial”, and “office”. The short rate, ten-year strip rate, inflation, and output gap are denoted
as r, r10, π, and g. Asterisks correspond to cases in which the post-1999q3 mean or standard
deviation of a variable is significantly different from the corresponding statistic pre-1999q3. While
there is no clear evidence that cash flow variables underwent a significant change, real estate cap
rates have declined across the board in the post-1999q3 period. As mentioned in the introduction,
this decline in cap rates has been accompanied by a decline in interest rates, while inflation has
remained more or less steady (though perhaps more volatile).
Table 2.2 documents the correlations of the panel variables before and after 1999q3. The sec-
ond panel identifies correlation coefficients that are significantly different from those in the first.
Several patterns emerge. The relationship between real estate prices (as represented by cap rates)
and macro fundamentals seems to have undergone a significant change. This is especially pro-
nounced for the ten-year rate. Earning growths also experienced a change in their relationship with
macro fundamentals, but this seems to be primarily mediated through the output gap. Finally, as
expected with a persistent shift from an active to a passive monetary policy regime, the relationship
between long-term rates and inflation declined significantly.
The summary statistics provide suggestive evidence that the dynamics of both cash flow and
16Seasonality in the income growth series is not, overall, statistically significant.
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prices underwent a regime change along with macro fundamentals. Moreover, given that prices
correspond to discounted cash flow, the documented changes in the summary statistics were likely
mediated through both the cash flow growth and discount rate channels. However, the summary
statistics on their own do not provide a sense of whether/when prices reflect fundamentals and
through what channel. To address such questions one must employ some sort of model that ties
fundamentals to prices. To fit the data well, a model would also have to capture the changing
relationships between the price and fundamental variables. In the next section we describe such a
model.
2.4 Model
We employ an extension/variant of the Markov-switching rational expectations model proposed
in Bikbov and Chernov (2013). The model connects a small-scale New-Keynesian framework to
asset prices. Henceforth, to fix intuition and ease of exposition, we refer to the structural changes in
the relationship between macro fundamentals as arising from monetary policy (MP). As mentioned
earlier, regime changes in practice may be the result of other influences.
2.4.1 Macroeconomic Dynamics
Our specification of the macroeconomic dynamics allow for a simultaneous system of equa-
tions that are both forward- and backward-looking. The former provide consistency with a rational
expectations paradigm (see discussion in Bikbov and Chernov 2013). The variables of interest are
the output gap (gt), the inflation rate (πt), and short-term interest rate (rt). To match the granularity
of the time-series panel we choose the continuously compounded annualized yield on the 3-month
risk-free bond to proxy for rt.
(IS) gt = mg + (1− µg)gt−1 + µgEtgt+1 − φ(rt − Etπt+1) + σgε
g
t
(PC) πt = (1− µπ)πt−1 + µπEtπt+1 + δgt + σπεπt (2.1)
(MP) rt = mr(smt ) + ρ(s
m
t )rt−1 + α̂(s
m
t )Etπt+1 + β̂(smt )gt + σr(sdt )εrt
Where εit ∼iid N(0, 1) ∀i ∈ {g, π, r}, ∀t ∈ {1, . . . , T}.
The investment/savings (IS) relationship tells us current economic growth is a function of prior
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economic growth, agents’ expectations for future economic growth (conditional on today’s infor-
mation set), and the expected effective real rate next period. This captures the widely held notion
from macroeconomic theory, that a high cost of capital decreases economic growth through lower
investment. The Phillip’s curve (PC) reflects the persistence of price growth (through lagged infla-
tion), the influence of an economy below its potential (negative output gap) is to reduce inflation
through higher unemployment, and the notion that current prices anticipate higher future prices.
Note that this equation implies that the unconditional expected value of gt is zero. The monetary
policy rule (MP), similar to that used in Clarida et al. (2000), assumes that the monetary authority
responds to inflation expectations and economic growth.
We assume the presence of two types of regime state variables, smt and s
d
t , where s
i
t ∈ {0, 1}
for i ∈ {d,m}. Thus, at each point in time the macro-economy can be in one of four regimes
corresponding to the pair, St = (smt , s
d
t ). The regime driving changes to the monetary policy
response, smt , allows for the simultaneous change of the short-rate drift, mr(s
m
t ), the interest-rate
smoothing parameter, ρ(smt ), the response to inflation expectations, α̂(s
m
t ), and the response to the
output gap, β̂(smt ). The regimes associated with s
d
t only impact σ(s
d
t ) and correspond to changes in
the discretionary component to monetary policy by capturing different possible levels of tolerance
by the monetary authority for deviations from its rule.17 We assume that each of smt and s
d
t follows
an independent (but not identical) 2-state Markov chain.
All macro-economic dynamics in the model are driven by the state vector xt = (gt, πt, rt), and
the Markov regime St. Assuming a transversality condition, Cho (2016) establishes that the system
of equations in (2.1) can be expressed in VAR form as
xt = m(St) + Φ(St)xt−1 + Σ(St)εt+1, (2.2)
where for each realization of St the VAR parameters (m(St), Φ(St), and Σ(St)) satisfy non-linear
17To capture the period before the so-called “Great Moderation”, Bikbov and Chernov (2013) also include a third
regime state variable that impacts the volatility of the output gap and inflation. None of our data precedes the Great
Moderation. Moreover, a White Test on the volatility of the output gap and inflation during our sample cannot reject
the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity at the 10% significance level. We therefore dispense with this third regime.
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restrictions.18 The non-linear restrictions arise through the forward-looking components when one
plugs (2.2) in (2.1).
To price assets that depend on xt, one must also specify the dynamics of a risk-adjusted (i.e.,
“risk-neutral”) version of (2.2). Following Bikbov and Chernov (2013) and the literature on affine
term-structure models (e.g., Duffee 2002), we assume that risk premia can be a time-varying linear









The vector Π0 and matrix Πx are constant, while ε
Q
t is standard Normal under the risk-neutral
measure, Q.
2.4.2 Asset Pricing
Consider a payoff of Dτ in quarter τ . Denote the present value of Dτ at period t < τ as
PVt[Dτ ] = Et[Mτ ,tDτ ] ≡ EQt [e−
∑τ−1
s=t rsDτ ],
where Et[·] denotes the expectation operator conditional on information at t, Mτ ,t is the state-
price deflator at t for payoffs at τ ≥ t, and EQt [·] is the expectation operator under the equivalent
martingale measure (i.e., risk-neutral expectations).




] = EQt [
Dt+1
Dt
] = eνt .
18See also discussions in Bikbov and Chernov (2013) and Cho (2016).
60
Here, νt can be interpreted as the growth rate of cash flow. This assumption in the equation above
implies that investors do not require compensation to level shocks of cash flows. Thus risk premia
can only be associated with shocks to the expected growth rates of cash flows.19 It follows that an






































Let ln ξQs = ν
Q
s − rQs denote the distribution of νs − rs under the risk-neutral measure, Q. In
an appendix to their paper, Bikbov and Chernov (2013) suggest a way of calculating expectations
of the form appearing in (2.4) whenever ln ξs is Normally distributed conditional on the path of
Markov-switching variables. Their method is accurate up to about 40 periods (i.e., ten years).
Because rs satisfies this conditional Normality requirement, one can apply their method to pricing
bonds (which they do). One can also apply the same methodology to other assets as long as νQs also
preserves this conditional Normality assumption. To stay within this computational constraint, we
19This is consistent with the findings of the so-called “long-run risk” literature (starting with Bansal and Yaron
2004) where dominant sources of risk premia are shocks to expectations of growth rates rather than level shocks. We
make this assumptions to reduce the number of priced shocks in the model.
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assume the following structure for real estate asset income. For a given sequence of asset payoffs,
identified by the subscript j, we assume that
νj,t = aj + γj,ππt + γj,ggt + ρjνj,t−1 + uj,t,
The shock uj,t is independent of the macro-fundamental shocks (the εt+1’s), is Normally dis-
tributed, serially uncorrelated, and has conditional variance σ2j,u.
We further assume that the risk-neutral dynamics of νj,t are given by






j,t−1 − `j + u
Q
j,t,
where `j,g is a risk-premium and u
Q
j,t is Normally distributed with variance σ
2
j,u. These assumptions
guarantee that both ln ξs and ln ξ
Q
s are Normally distributed conditional on the path of Markov-
switching variables.
While the assets in which we’re interested (real estate and stocks) have an infinite payoff hori-






up to about 40 quarters. To overcome
this additional difficulty, we borrow from the approach investors commonly take when calculating

















One can view Qj,K as a continuation value for Qj,t, K−periods in the future. We approximate Qj,t
by setting K = 39 (ten years out) and Qj,K ≡ Q∗j (a constant) in the second term. The constant,

















where EQ[] corresponds to an unconditional expectation.
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2.4.3 Additional model details and estimation procedure
The data set includes proxies for the state variables, xt = (gt, πt, rt), a vector yt of longer-
maturity treasury strips (2-year, 5-year, & 10-year), the observed (rather than expected) asset
growth rates νgj,t, and asset cap rates cj,t (with j = A, I and O). We assume that the short-term
interest rate is observed without measurement error, while the longer-term strip yields, earning
growths, and cap rates are observed with standard normal i.i.d. measurement error. We estimate
the model via maximum likelihood. For the macroeconomic state variables and regimes, and the
treasury securities, the approach loosely adheres to Bikbov and Chernov (2013).20 The estima-
tion procedure is constrained to parameterizations such that the forward solution exists, and the
process conditional on any regime is stable in the mean-square sense under both the physical, and
risk-neutral measure. Following Bikbov and Chernov (2013) we restrict δ, φ ≥ 0.
We assume that the correlations between the three real estate income growth rates can be mod-
eled via a loading on a single systematic factor:
uj,t = wj,t + σj,ZZt, j ∈ {A, I,O},
where Zt is a standard iid Normal variable that is independent of all other shocks in the model, wj,t
is an idiosyncratic component with variance σ2j,W , and real-estate risk premium is `j = λZσj,W .
Because expected growth rates and earnings yields (the νj,t’s and Qj,t’s, respectively) can only









− ln cj,t − lnQj,t = σ2j,Qε
Q
j,t,
where the ε’s correspond to iid standard Normal measurement errors and j ranges over A, I and
20See also, Dai, Singleton, and Yang (2007) and Ang, Bekaert, and Wei (2008).
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O. These expressions can be incorporated into the log-likelihood function in the usual way. Note
that to estimate the model we do not have to observe or filter uj,t as only its variance enters into
the likelihood function as described. Moreover, the variances of the uj,t’s (or subcomponents, in
the case of the real estate assets) can be identified because they appear in the covariance matrix as
well as the price levels through a Jensen’s inequality term.
Table 2.3 summarizes the model parameters. Due to the likelihood being highly non-linear,
we perform a search for the global maximum, constraining the VAR coefficient matrices (under
the physical and risk-neutral measures, respectively) to have eigenvalues smaller than one. We
generate a quasi-random Sobol grid of 1,000,000 nodes over a reasonable parameter space. We
then evaluate the likelihood of each point. An optimization procedure is then run using the nodes
with the highest 1000 likelihood values. The highest resulting likelihood is then the final parameter
estimate. Confidence intervals are then computed by simulating 1000 panels of the data using
the model parameter and re-estimating the parameters for each of the panels. This results in a
distribution of parameter that can be used to calculate a confidence interval.
2.5 Model Estimation Results
We estimate two versions of the model. The first version, similar to the exercise undertaken by
Bikbov and Chernov (2013) only includes zero coupon bonds among the asset prices incorporated
into the estimation procedure (the TSM model). We then incorporate the three real estate portfolio
income and price series to the estimation (the CAP model).
Figure 2.3 depicts the latent regime variables in the TSM and CAP models. The most striking
element of the comparison between the two estimates is that the CAP model regimes are much
more persistent. The added stability can be attributed to the fact that the regimes now have to
explain both bond and real estate prices. One way to explain this is that in estimating the TSM
model the likelihood function introduces “spurious” regimes to better fit to bond prices. In the
CAP model, howver, these spurious regimes would signal dramatic shifts in real estate prices that
are not observed in practice. Thus, one may conclude that, beyond being influenced by monetary
policy regimes, real estate prices can be instrumental in identifying them.
Figures 2.4 and 2.5 provide a visual sense of the CAP model fit. Specifically, the macro state
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variables (gt, πt and r) are tracked well by their one-step ahead forecasts. The fit to bond prices
is adequate (measurement errors of 40), but not as good as under the TSM model (not depicted
in the figure). This is consistent with other studies (e.g., Chiang et al. 2015) in which the fit to
prices erodes with the addition of more assets in the estimation. This happens because, despite the
addition of more model parameters, the same basic fundamentals are required to explain a greater
range of dynamics.
The real estate income growth series on the right side of 2.5 (i.e., the νg’s) are closely tracked by
their forecasts conditional on πt, gt and lagged ν
g
t (i.e., the ν’s). The fit to real estate cap rates (left)
is generally good, ignoring 2006q1-2008q4. The plots depict several periods during which the data
persistently departs from the model. This can be because some persistent factor is missing from
the model. For instance, it might be that during the recent prolonged episode of quantitative easing
(2015-2017), interest rate dynamics were unlike anything seen before and beyond the ability of
our model to capture.21 Alternatively, prolonged departures between the model and prices might
arise whenever prices exhibit a more tenuous connection with fundamentals. Indeed, the most
pronounced example of this is furnished by the period between 2005-2010 when prices across all
asset categories were above their model values. While it is difficult to attribute a direct cause for a
difference between actual prices and prices generated by fundamentals through a model, examining
such differences can contribute to a discussion (e.g., among policy makers) that contemplates the
various influences at play.
Tables 2.4-2.7 report on the estimated model parameters for the TSM and CAP models. Esti-
mates of macro fundamental parameters are roughly in agreement across the two models. Inter-
estingly, the monetary policy coefficients, α̂ and β̂, are more distinct across regimes in the CAP
model estimation. Generally, based on the bootstrapped confidence intervals, we find positive and
significant sensitivity to the output gap and inflation across the cash flow time series of the real
estate assets. An OLS analysis of real estate cash flow dependence on macro fundamentals yields
21There is no “zero lower bound” in our model, where the short-term interest rate, conditional on the regime path,
has a Gaussian distribution.
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similar results for the output gap, but insignificant loadings on inflation. This highlights the disad-
vantage of analyzing cash flow growth fundamentals without also including price information. It is
important to add that real estate income is generally positively associated with inflation using uni-
variate measures of association but, because inflation and the output gap are positively correlated,
in a multivariate OLS analysis the loading on inflation declines and may even be negative.
Risk premium specific to real estate cash flow (i.e., net of the premium assessed via exposure
to inflation and the output gap) corresponds to σi,ZλZ . Across the three assets, the quarterly sys-
tematic volatility, σi,Z , is close to 30 basis points. The real estate risk premiu, λZ = 0.42, amounts
to a quarterly risk premium of about 15 basis points, or roughly 0.6% per annum. It is possible that
some portion of this risk premium is associated with the liquidity risk associated with investing in
physical real estate.
Finally, we conduct several tests to assess the extent to which it is important to jointly estimate
the macro and (real estate) asset pricing components of the model. First, we ask whether the
data can distinguish between CAP model estimates of the macro fundamental parameters and their
TSM counterparts. To that end, we compare the maximum likelihood of the TSM model with the
TSM-model likelihood calculated when the TSM parameters equal the CAP model estimates. The
resulting likelihood ratio test (Chi-Squared, with 34 degrees of freedom) rejects the null hypothesis
that the models estimates are the same with p < 10−10. In other words, including real estate prices
in a joint estimation profoundly changes the inference of the macroeconomic parameters. Next,
we constrain the macro fundamental parameters in the CAP model to their values under the TSM
model. We then estimate only the real estate asset fundamental parameters (listed in Table 2.3)
and compare the likelihood of the constrained and unconstrained CAP model estimates. This
likelihood ratio test (Chi-Squared, with 34 degrees of freedom) also rejects the null hypothesis
that the models estimates are the same with p < 10−10. In other words, real estate prices contain
information about macro fundamentals. This is consistent with the observation made earlier about
the smoothed empirically observed monetary policy regime in Figure 2.3. Indeed, while one cannot
reject the hypothesis that the dynamic discretionary (i.e., rigid/flxible — the two red-dashed lines
in the figure) regime variables inferred by the two models are equivalent, it is possible to reject
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(p < 0.005) that this is so for the monetary policy regime (i.e., active/passive — the two blue solid
lines in the figure).
2.6 Real Estate Sensitivity to Macroeconomic Regimes
2.6.1 Price dynamics and regime “impulse response”
The model estimates can be used to study the impact of monetary policy regimes and their
changes on asset prices. Figures 2.6-2.8 depict the model behavior of expected cap rates based
on the estimated model parameters. Each period represents one quarter. In Quarter 0, the cap
rate is initialized to the expected value of macro-fundamentals conditional one of four regime
combinations (Active/Flexible, Active/Rigid, Passive/Flexible and Passive/Rigid). For each such
combination, the blue circles correspond to a baseline evolution. The red pluses and yellow stars
correspond to experiments in which at quarter 1 there is a single regime change. For instance, if
in Quarter 0 the regimes correspond to an Active/Flexible combination of states (top right panel in
the figure), then the plot with red pluses denotes the evolution of cap rates if in Quarter 1 there is a
change to a Passive/Flexible combination of states. This type of experiment is akin to an impulse
response function for cap rates.22
To obtain the plots, we first calculate the expected value of the macro state variables in each
of the eight combinations of regimes: {Passive, Active} × { Flexible, Rigid}. This is used to
initialize economy at Quarter 0. From this initial point, we simulate 40 quarters of data from the
model data generating process (under the physical measure) and plot the average cap rate. The
impulse response functions are generated by forcing the regime to change in Quarter 1.
The lowest cap rates across all asset types is associated with a Passive/Rigid regime where
monetary policy does not target inflation nor aim to curtail growth by increasing interest rates,
and the policy implementation is disciplined (exhibiting low rate volatility). According to Figure
2.3, this regime combination has been in place since roughly 2012. The regime combinations,
Passive/Flexible and Active/Rigid, are largely “stable” in that cap rate forecasts are similar to cur-
rent cap rates. The regime combination, Active/Flexible, corresponds to a loose inflation-fighting
22While there are possible regime changes, changing more than one of the sit’s at a time is a very low probability
event given the persistence of the independent regimes.
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regime in which Fed rate decisions are less predictable and overall rates are above average. Sudden
regime changes can lead to cap rate changes of 100-150 basis points, corresponding to valuation
changes of 15%-20%. Such sharp regime changes would be a rare occurrence as in practice (and
in the model) regime changes are probabilistic.23 Still, such jumps denote the impact on prices
that a clear and persistent policy chance is credibly communicated to markets. What this exercise
demonstrates is that monetary policy can have a large impact on real CRE prices.
2.6.2 Risk premia
The risk premia reported in Tables 2.5 and 2.7 directly apply to real estate income growth (e.g.,
the risk of a $1 “bond” that delivers the income from a real estate investment held for one year).
Real estate assets can be viewed as a perpetuity of stochastic income and, just as long-maturity
bonds coupon may be riskier than short maturity bonds, real estate assets may be riskier than
might indicated by their time-series of income .
One way to measure the risk premium associated with a real estate asset is to compare the
cap rate using the physical measure (P-measure) with its actual value as calculated using the Q-
measure. Table ?? reports on this cap rate spread in the different regimes. The table documents
the results of simulating the macroeconomic state vector, xt, conditional only on being in a fixed
regime. For each simulated value of xt we calculate the corresponding cap rates under the Q and P
measures and calculate their differences. The mean and 95% “confidence interval” of the resulting
distribution of cap rate spreads is reported in Table ??. The real estate risk premia are lowest
(highest) in the Passive-Rigid (Active-Flexible) regime, consistent with the observation that this is
also the highest (lowest) price regime. Within regime, the risk premium may exhibit substantial
variation, with the greatest degree of variation present in the Active-Flexible regime.
Figure 2.9 plots the model implied time-series of cap rate spreads (i.e., risk-premia). Each
quarter, xt and its corresponding cap rate spread is calculated in each regime, and then the filtered
probabilities at date t are used to weight the plotted risk premia. The plot depicts a secular decline
23The regimes in Figure 2.3 are smoothed, meaning that they represent what the policy would most likely have
been at any date in the sample given what we know about the entire sample. The prices calculated to fit the model and
in the estimation correspond to the filtered probability which represents investors’ best guess as to the current regime
(which is unobservable to both investors and the econometrician).
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in the real estate risk premium across all asset types. The most pronounced changes appear to have
taken place after 2000. The dramatic results of quantitative easing, which in the model corresponds
to the onset of a Passive-Rigid regime, are observed in the post-2011 period.
2.6.3 Macroeconomic regimes and mortgage spreads
As mentioned in the Introduction, CRE mortgages represent a large proportion of regional
and local banks’ loan portfolios. Given that the underlying collateral has substantial exposure to
monetary policy shocks, it seems natural to ask how the loan portfolios themselves might behave.
We examine separately loans secured by real estate portfolios corresponding to each of the three
CRE asset types studied earlier, and assume that each such portfolio has the same characteristics
as our aggregate time series. For instance, the apartment portfolio collateral has time series price
governed by the model dynamics in Section 2.5.
Consider a ten-year interest-only (IO) non-prepayable mortgage on a property that pays ac-
cording to the following rules: (i) An interest coupon of rm/4 is paid each quarter on the original
principal borrowed as long as it is less than NOI produced by the property that quarter. (ii) If the
NOI cannot cover the interest payment, all income is paid that quarter to the lender and the prin-
cipal owed is increased by the difference between rm/4 and NOI (i.e., negative ammortization).
(iii) In Year 10, the lender is paid the lesser of the principal owed plus the last coupon payment, or
property value plus last NOI.
We solve for rm/4 by simulating and averaging payoff paths under the Q-measure and dis-
counting by the compounded risk-free short-term rate. The solution is obtained by setting the
average equal to the loan amount (a fraction of the asset value as determined by the initial loan-to-
value). We compare rm to the value of a 10-year treasury par bond to calculate the corresponding
“default” spread.
For each regime combination, we initialize the economy at contract inception to the mean state
variables conditional on the regime combination. The resulting mortgage spreads are plotted in
Figure 2.10. With mortgage pricing, there is a tension between the size of the risk premium (high
in the “A/F” compound regime and low in the “P/R” compound regime) versus forecasted asset
value (increasing in the “A/F” compound regime and decreasing in the “P/R” compound regime).
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In the case of the “A/F” (currently low prices and high risk-premium) regime, the anticipation of
increasing prices and therefore lower default risk is the more dominant effect, and the mortgage
spread is low. In the “P/R” regime (or low-price and high risk-premium) compound regime, the
lower risk premia is balanced against the anticipation of increasing prices and this leads to higher
mortgage spreads.
At high LTVs, the difference in spreads across extreme policy scenarios is over 100 basis
points. Consistent with documented evidence for CRE mortgages (see, for example, Downing,
Stanton, and Wallace 2008), apartment properties exhibit the smallest mortgage spread. It is im-
portant to emphasize that assessment arises strictly from calculating the present value using cash
flow fundamentals for apartment properties. In addition, it is also important to keep in mind the
dominant role played by the Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs) in underwriting apartment
property mortgages. This may additionally lower apartment mortgage spreads relative to “funda-
mentals” (i.e., what they would be without an effective government “subsidy”). Thus, another role
for the model could be in modeling the impact of privatizing the GSEs on commercial real estate
mortgages.
The magnitudes of the spreads we calculate are roughly commensurate with the pricing of
investment-grade CMBS fixed-rate bonds, which are essentially loans that only default if a large
and well-diversified portfolio of CRE substantially declines in value. For instance, AAA CMBS
bonds subordinated by roughly 30% of more junior tranches typically traded at a spread of close
to 100 bps to treasuries in 2013. By contrast, BBB bonds around the same time might have only
enjoyed subordination levels between 5% and 10% and traded around 250 bps above treasuries.
To provide a better sense of how CRE mortgage spreads might vary with the macroeconomic
environment we depict them as a time series in Figure 2.11 at 65% and 80% LTV. Similar to
Figure 2.9, the plotted mortgage spread at date t weights the various regime spreads using the
filtered probabilities at date t. Here we see that, holding constant historical subordination levels,
CMBS bonds issued since 2011 are likely “riskier”.
To obtain a sense for how a regime change can impact existing mortgages, first calculate the
mortgage price in a given regime (at the average of the state variables) for a fixed LTV. Then,
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as with the “impulse response” experiment discussed earlier, we force the economy into another
regime the following quarter. The plots in Figure 2.12 depict the corresponding price impact as a
function of LTV. Here too, there are two forces. A change in regime impacts both the collateral
value as well as income growth rates.
A shift into the “A/F” regime from any other regime tends to result in substantive losses (as
much as 30% if the origination regime is “P/R”). Correspondingly, existing loans can dramatically
increase in value, especially when entering a “F/R” regime. Interpreting the recent episode of
quantitative easing as a “F/R” regime suggests that monetary policy succeeded in shoring up bank
balance sheets by increasing the value of banks’ loans. On the flip side, it is easy to see how a
protracted “F/R” regime might lead to fragility in the banking sector. As old CRE debt is retired or
refinanced it is replaced with debt that is more susceptible to being marked down in value (as seen
by the higher default spreads in Figure 2.10). The top-right panel in Figure 2.12 demonstrates that
a regime change will result in a double digit loss in banks’ CRE loan portfolio.
2.7 Conclusions
There is a great deal of evidence that the structural relationship between macro-fundamentals
changes through time. Intuitively, this can have a profound impact on commercial real estate
assets, whose cash flow positively depend on both inflation and real output. By estimating a model
of regime changes in macro-fundamentals, together with how they are related to discount rates and
asset cash flow, we are able to quantify the impact of macreconomic regime changes (like monetary
policy) on real estate asset prices. Our model may be used to both forecast real estate cap rates as
well as conduct experiments to assess the future impact of a monetary policy change on property
and mortgage portfolios.
We are able to identify four regimes distinguished by high/low interest rate volatility and
high/low sensitivity to both inflation and the real output gap. A high volatility regime in which
interest rates are sensitive to inflation and output is characterized by high cost of capital (and risk
premia), and low asset prices. A low volatility regime in which interest rates are insensitive to in-
flation and output features low cost of capital (and risk premia), and high asset prices. According to
our estimate, the U.S. economy has been in the latter state since roughly 2011. A sudden change in
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policy can result in a substantial decline in prices of commercial real estate (and associate existing
mortgages).
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Figure 2.1: NCREIF Apartment (a) cap rates and (b) NOI growth rates.


















































































Figure 2.3: Smoothed regime probabilities for the estimated TSM and full model.
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Figure 2.4: Depiction of the model fit to the data. We exclude real state cap rate data from 2006q1-2008q4 in the estimation. The top panel
plots the macro state variables (output gap, gt; inflation, πt; short rate, rt) alongside the one-step-ahead model forecasts (variables with
“carets”). The bottom panel plots the various treasury strip prices (2-, 5-, and 10-year strip yields) against the fitted model values.
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Figure 2.5: Depiction of the model fit to the data. We exclude real state cap rate data from 2006q1-2008q4 in the estimation. The panels on
the left plot the model fit to the log of annualized price-to-NOI or “PD” ratio for each of the three RE investment categories. The panels on
the right plot NOI growth against expected NOI growth conditional on inflation, the output gap, and lagged NOI growth.
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Figure 2.6: Estimated model dynamics of apartment cap rates (earnings-to-price ratios). Each period represents one quarter. Quarter 0 is
initialized to the expected value of macro-fundamentals conditional on the regime (the regime is labeled above each plot). The blue circles
correspond to the baseline estimate. The red pluses and yellow stars correspond to experiments in which at quarter 1 there is a single regime
change (Active↔ Passive, or Rigid↔ Flexible).
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Figure 2.7: Estimated model dynamics of industrial cap rates (earnings-to-price ratios). Each period represents one quarter. Quarter 0 is
initialized to the expected value of macro-fundamentals conditional on the regime (the regime is labeled above each plot). The blue circles
correspond to the baseline estimate. The red pluses and yellow stars correspond to experiments in which at quarter 1 there is a single regime
change (Active↔ Passive, or Rigid↔ Flexible).
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Figure 2.8: Estimated model dynamics of office cap rates (earnings-to-price ratios). Each period represents one quarter. Quarter 0 is
initialized to the expected value of macro-fundamentals conditional on the regime (the regime is labeled above each plot). The blue circles
correspond to the baseline estimate. The red pluses and yellow stars correspond to experiments in which at quarter 1 there is a single regime
change (Active↔ Passive, or Rigid↔ Flexible).
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Figure 2.9: Model implied time-series of real estate risk-premia calculated by subtracting model
cap rates under the P-measure from cap rates calculated under the Q-measure.
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Figure 2.10: Model-imputed default spreads on interest-only mortgages secured to a diversified portfolio of real estate assets. The x-
axis denotes loan-to-value (LTV) and the y-axis measures spreads over 10-year treasury strips. Each line corresponds to one of four
combinations of the two regimes state variables in the model. To calculate the mortgage values, the prevailing macro-fundamentals are
assumed to be at their expected value conditional on the regime.
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Figure 2.11: Time series of model-imputed default spreads on newly issued interest-only mort-
gages secured to a diversified portfolio of real estate assets. The y-axis measures spreads over
10-year treasury strips. The top (bottom) figure corresponds to a mortgage with 65% (80%) loan-
to-value (LTV) at origination.
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Figure 2.12: Estimated model impact of a regime-change on an interest-only mortgages secured to a diversified portfolio of real estate
assets. The x-axis denotes loan-to-value (LTV) and the y-axis measures the change in value of a newly issued mortgage if the interest rate
regime is changed. Mortgages values are first calculated based on the expected value of macro-fundamentals conditional on a regime, and
the regime is subsequently “forced” to change and the mortgage value is recalculated.
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics for the panel variables before and after the 1999q3 monetary policy
regime break identified in Bianchi (2013). Asterisks correspond to cases in which the post-1999q3
mean or standard deviation of a variable is significantly different from the corresponding statistic
pre-1999q3. The µi’s denote income growth rates while the ci’s denote cap rates (i.e., earnings
yields). The subscripts A, I , and O respectively denote“apartments”, “industrial”, and “office”.
The short rate, ten-year strip rate, inflation, and output gap are denoted as r, r10, π, and g.
pre-1999q3 post-1999q3
Mean SD min max Mean SD min max
µA 0.023 0.029 -0.049 0.081 0.011* 0.023 -0.046 0.061
µI 0.009 0.033 -0.055 0.06 0.005 0.024 -0.05 0.081
µO -0.003 0.07 -0.158 0.174 0.001 0.035** -0.097 0.072
cA 0.084 0.003 0.075 0.088 0.057*** 0.012*** 0.044 0.081
cI 0.09 0.004 0.081 0.096 0.068*** 0.013*** 0.049 0.088
cO 0.085 0.005 0.072 0.094 0.063*** 0.014*** 0.043 0.087
r 0.045 0.009 0.027 0.058 0.02*** 0.02*** 0 0.062
r10 0.063 0.009 0.044 0.077 0.04*** 0.012 0.017 0.064
π 0.019 0.004 0.011 0.024 0.02 0.007** 0.002 0.033
g -0.001 0.005 -0.013 0.008 0.001 0.013*** -0.03 0.023
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 2.2: Correlations of the panel variables before and after the 1999q3 monetary policy regime break identified in Bianchi (2013).
The second panel identifies correlation coefficients that are significantly different from those in the first. The µi’s denote income growth
rates while the ci’s denote cap rates (i.e., earnings yields). The subscripts A, I , and O respectively denote“apartments”, “industrial”, and
“office”. The short rate, ten-year strip rate, and inflation are denoted as r, r10 and π.
pre-1999q3
µI µO cA cI cO r r10 π g
µA 0.144 -0.195 0.401 0.508 0.595 0.231 0.103 0.197 -0.052
µI 0.02 0.133 0.35 0.235 0.481 -0.134 -0.319 -0.24
µO -0.334 -0.322 -0.324 -0.184 0.059 0.073 0.281
cA 0.886 0.899 0.444 -0.034 -0.017 -0.657
cI 0.912 0.604 -0.006 -0.044 -0.696
cO 0.496 0.067 0.118 -0.608





µI µO cA cI cO r r10 π g
µA 0.499 0.458** -0.211** -0.286*** -0.306*** 0.214 0.009 0.229 0.428*
µI 0.375 -0.052 -0.217** -0.222* 0.388 0.219 0.363** 0.462**
µO -0.064 -0.194 -0.216 0.214 0.145 0.155 0.263
cA 0.931 0.907 0.404 0.617** -0.127 -0.164**
cI 0.986*** 0.285 0.603** -0.137 -0.358*
cO 0.259 0.57* -0.057 -0.362
r 0.801*** 0.576*** 0.643***
r10 0.299* 0.294
π 0.606***
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 2.3: Model parameters. The macro fundamentals are modeled as in Bikbov and Chernov
(2013). There are two monetary policy regime variables: smt corresponding to a passive versus
active policy, and sdt corresponding to whether the monetary authorities are “Flexible” or “Rigid”
about adhering to their smoothed policy targets. We consider three real estate asset categories:
Apartments (A), Industrial (I), and Office (O). Asset cash flow expected growth rates are modeled
as νj,t = aj + γj,ππt + γj,ggt + ρjνj,t−1 + uj,t.
Parameter symbol # parameters Notes
macro fundamentals 34
mg 1 drift of g
µi 2 smoothing (i = g, π)
φ 1 output gap response to real cost of capital
σi 2 shock volatility (i = g, π)
δ 1 inflation reaction to output gap
Prob(sm|sm) 2 prob. of staying in regime (sm=Passive or Active)
Prob(sd|sd) 2 prob. of staying regime (sd=Flexible or Rigid)
mr(s
m) 2 regime-dependent rate drift
ρ(sm) 2 regime-dependent rate smoothing
α̂(sm) 2 regime-dependent rate response to inflation
β̂(sm) 2 regime-dependent rate response to output gap
σr(s
d) 2 regime-dependent rate deviation from smoothed target
σy 1 pricing (measurement) error in bond yields
Π0,i 3 static risk premia (i ∈ {g, π, r}
Πx,ii′ 9 drift risk-adjustment (ii′ ∈ {g, π, r})
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asset fundamentals 25
aj 3 asset income drift (j = A, I,O)
γj,π 3 asset income inflation sensitivity (j = A, I,O)
γj,g 3 asset income output gap sensitivity (j = A, I,O)
ρg 3 asset income autocorrelation (j = A, I,O)
σj,W 3 real estate income idiosyncratic volatility (j = A, I,O)
σj,Z 3 real estate common income shock exposure (j = A, I,O)
σj,Q 3 pricing (measurement) error in asset (j = A, I,O)
σj,ν 3 measurement err. in expected NOI growth (j = A, I,O)
λZ 1 real estate risk Sharpe ratio (net of macro fundamentals)
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Table 2.4: Parameter estimates: Macro dynamics. Bootstrapped 95 percent Confidence interval in are parentheses. The TSM model
estimates only include zero coupon bond price. The CAP model estimates incorporate information from real estate income and prices.
An active (passive) MP regime is denoted by “A” (“P ”). A flexible (rigid) MP regime is denoted by “F ” (“R”).
Macro Fundamentals
mg × 103 µg µπ φ× 102 δ × 102
CAP 0.32 0.54 0.53 0.05 0.61
(-4.95,4.35) (0.53,0.60) (0.51,0.57) (0.04,0.22) (0.26,3.48)
TSM 0.39 0.53 0.49 0.02 0.45
(-87.34,36.27) (0.53,0.61) (0.47,0.50) (0.02,1.63) (0.22,1.29)
Monetary Policy
mr(A) mr(P ) ρ(A) ρ(P ) α̂(A) α̂(P ) β̂(A) β̂(P )
CAP -0.42 -0.13 0.98 0.96 0.43 0.10 0.66 0.08
(-1.18,-0.20) (-0.68,0.10) (0.95,0.99) (0.91,0.97) (0.24,0.89) (0.06,0.31) (0.35,1.33) (0.05,0.27)
TSM -0.45 -0.58 0.98 0.98 0.29 0.26 0.06 -0.00
(-1.74,0.30) (-1.70,0.31) (0.97,0.98) (0.97,0.98) (0.28,0.47) (0.20,0.37) (0.05,0.10) (-0.02,0.02)
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Volatilities
σg σπ σr(F ) σr(R) σy
CAP 0.589 0.252 0.910 0.329 0.402
(0.501,0.834) (0.208,0.354) (0.835,1.659) (0.316,0.939) (0.376,0.884)
TSM 0.56 0.25 1.16 0.35 0.26
(0.30,0.97) (0.19,0.34) (0.55,2.31) (0.19,1.13) (0.20,1.75)
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Table 2.7: Parameter estimates: Asset-market dynamics. The first three panels report estimated
income dynamics parameters. The last panel reports the Sharpe ratio of real estate risk net of
macro fundamentals. Bootstrapped 95 percent Confidence interval in are parentheses. The TSM
model estimates only include zero coupon bond price. The CAP model estimates incorporate
information from real estate income and prices. An active (passive) MP regime is denoted by “A”
(“P ”). A flexible (rigid) MP regime is denoted by “F ” (“R”).
Apartment
γA,g γA,π ρA γA,c × 103
1.21 0.31 0.56 1.21
(0.91,2.18) (-0.26,0.81) (0.39,0.86) (-2.17,5.08)
σA,W × 102 σA,Z × 102 σA,Q × 102 σA,ν × 102
0.42 0.30 6.15 0.41
(0.34,0.57) (0.20,0.64) (0.10,12.30) (0.37,0.60)
Industrial
γI,g γI,π ρI γI,c × 103
0.60 0.73 0.64 -2.24
(0.36,1.65) (0.13,1.30) (0.39,0.83) (-5.40,1.43)
σI,W × 102 σI,Z × 102 σI,Q × 102 σI,ν × 102
0.47 0.35 5.26 0.49
(0.41,0.66) (0.30,0.72) (0.10,9.86) (0.42,0.67)
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Office
γO,g γO,π ρO γO,c × 103
0.77 0.71 0.71 -1.32
(0.52,1.80) (0.11,1.26) (0.52,0.88) (-4.38,2.11)
σO,W × 102 σO,Z × 102 σO,Q × 10w σO,ν × 102
0.51 0.26 7.34 0.57





Table 2.5: Parameter estimates: Macro risk premia. Bootstrapped 95 percent Confidence interval
in are parentheses. The TSM model estimates only include zero coupon bond price. The CAP
model estimates incorporate information from real estate income and prices. An active (passive)
MP regime is denoted by “A” (“P ”). A flexible (rigid) MP regime is denoted by “F ” (“R”).
Π0 g π r
CAP -0.34 1.48 -1.67
(-0.94,0.71) (1.29,3.56) (-2.23,-0.76)
TSM 0.59 -3.2 -2.01
(0.35,0.99) (-3.57,-2.74) (-3.21,-1.32)
Πx g π r
g
CAP 1.38 -0.16 0.43
(0.89,2.46) (-0.64,0.22) (0.29,0.85)
TSM 2.26 -1.29 -2.18
(1.67,2.94) (-1.82,-0.22) (-2.75,-1.15)
π
CAP -14.02 2.64 -3.10
(-14.53,-12.73) (1.85,4.20) (-3.98,-2.38)
TSM 0.91 2.94 0.73
(0.45,2.01) (2.27,3.68) (-0.06,1.38)
r
CAP 0.52 0.46 -0.07
(-0.29,1.19) (-0.19,0.72) (-0.27,0.10)
TSM -0.01 0.48 0.04
(-0.79,0.98) (-1.33,0.83) (-0.60,0.56)
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Table 2.6: Parameter estimates: Macro regime persistence (quarterly probability of remaining in
current regime). Bootstrapped 95 percent Confidence interval in are parentheses. The TSM model
estimates only include zero coupon bond price. The CAP model estimates incorporate information
from real estate income and prices. An active (passive) MP regime is denoted by “A” (“P ”). A
flexible (rigid) MP regime is denoted by “F ” (“R”).
CAP TSM
Active monetary policy regime variable smt
smt = A 97.45 97.39
(55.96,98.69) (95.51,99.86)
smt = P 98.43 92.70
(56.72,98.91) (83.59,99.86)
Flexible monetary policy regime variable sdt
sdt = F 98.23 93.41
(55.76,98.88) (87.57,98.84)
sdt = R 96.94 90.40
(86.10,98.54) (48.85,99.83)
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Table 2.8: Model implied real estate risk-premia calculated by subtracting model cap rates under
the P-measure from cap rates calculated under the Q-measure. The risk premium depends on both
the regime and the value of the macroeconomic fundamentals. We simulate the macroeconomic
fundamentals in each regime and calculate the corresponding real estate risk premium. The table
reports the mean and 95%-intervals for the risk premium in each regime. An active (passive) MP
regime is denoted by “A” (“P ”). A flexible (rigid) MP regime is denoted by “F ” (“R”).
Regime A/F A/R P/F P/R
Apartments 0.065 0.054 0.052 0.041
(0.044,0.095) (0.039,0.075) (0.034,0.075) (0.031,0.052)
Industrial 0.06 0.05 0.054 0.041
(0.045,0.081) (0.040,0.062) (0.035,0.076) (0.032,0.052)
Office 0.065 0.054 0.057 0.044




This is the appendix for the first chapter. The appendices go at the end after all of the chapters,
not after the chapter it corresponds to.
A.1 Description of ULURP
The ULURP sets forth a legislative process that any rezoning in NYC needs to follow. This
section serves as a brief description of the data-points that will be collected.
First a application is submitted either by an individual, company, interest group, or the mayor’s
office. The application is then certified by the city planning commission a sub-committee of the
City Council (CC) usually within 6 months (though no official time-limit is imposed). Once certi-
fied, the process continues. Dates of both submission of application and certification are collected.
Once the application is certified, the community board (CB) holds a town meeting where af-
fected residents are allowed to discuss, vote, and send forth a recommendation to the BP and
CPC. The date, vote tally, and recommendation (recommend, recommend with revisions, or do not
recommend) is collected.
If the project affects a single borough, with the information from the CB, the BP makes a
recommendation to the CPC. The date, and recommendation are collected. The BP has 30 days
from receiving the CB recommendation. If the project affects multiple boroughs, a borough board
(BB) is formed and votes on a recommendation.
Upon receiving the BP’s recommendation, the CPC holds a vote on the proposal. They either
vote to approve, approve with changes, or reject a proposal. Zoning map changes are required to
go in-front of the City Council (CC). The date and outcome are collected.
The CC then reviews the proposal within 50 days of the CPC vote. The vote tally and recom-
mendation are collected. If the vote passes, the mayor has 5 days to veto. In the case of a veto, the
CC can overrule the veto with a 2/3rds majority and has 10 days to do so.
To add an additional source of nuance to the proposal, it is an unwritten tradition in the CC
where the CC typically votes with the local member; giving the local member veto power.
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